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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of organizational policy changes within 
the Use-of-Force Continuum on taser usage and officer’s perceptions of taser effectiveness. 
Tasers have been used by police since the 1970s and their use is increasing as the technology has 
improved. Data reveals that tasers are beneficial for controlling non-compliant suspects while 
preventing serious injuries and rarely has  their use resulted in death. Much of the public 
controversy surrounding tasers centers on when and how often officers deploy them. Use of 
force data from 890 police citizen encounters during a two-year period was analyzed to examine 
how changes in organizational policy have affected taser deployments and how policy changes 
have affected taser use. The study’s findings support that after the policy change, the frequency 
of taser use by officers decreased, while the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers 
increased. The frequency and severity of suspect injuries did not change and the numbers of 
officers injured in use-of-force encounters also did not change. Survey response data from 
officers were compared to archival data, which revealed that while officers perceive an increased 
risk of harm to themselves as a result of the organizational policy change that was not supported 
in the findings. Officers did not perceive an increased risk of harm to suspects which was 
supported in the archival data findings. Officers also expressed a belief that the organizational 
change that placed the taser at a higher level on the Use-of-Force Continuum is appropriate for 
most use-of-force encounters. This study concludes with future directions and trends for taser use 
in law enforcement.    
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASP  An expandable metal baton is an impact weapon used to deliver blows to specific 
areas of the body to gain compliance from a resisting or noncompliant suspect. 
This weapon is issued by the Orlando Police Department. 
 
CED Conducted energy devices encompass a wide range of weapons that rely on 
electrical shock to incapacitate combative and/or noncompliant suspects. These 
include stun guns, stun belts, electronic control devices, and tasers. 
 
CN Chloroacetaphenone, or tear gas, was introduced for police use in the 1960s. Its 
principle use was in civil disorders or riots. It is an irritant that produces burning 
in the eyes, nose, and throat. 
  
CS          Ortho/Chlorobenzal-Malononitrile is another disabling gas. It came into use 
during the 1960s and 1970s. CS gas causes pain in the nose, throat, and chest. 
 
ECD Electronic control device is a term used by the Orlando Police Department to 
describe the taser in their policies and procedures.  
 
LTL Less-than-lethal weapons are a category of use-of-force weapons, which are 
designed to gain compliance from noncompliant subjects without inflicting 
serious or lethal injuries. 
 
OC Oleoresin Capsicum, or OC, is derived from an irritant in cayenne pepper. It is a 
bottle propelled by compressed air that is sprayed into the facial area of a 
noncompliant subject. This results in mild respiratory distress and temporary loss 
of vision. 
 
   
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The issue of police use of force remains a topic of intense debate that requires further 
research for criminal justice practitioners and scholars. Police officers are one of the most visible 
arms of government, and they are entrusted with substantial authority and discretion (Bittner, 
1970; Fyfe, 1988). They are the only members of society legally authorized to take life or inflict 
serious injury to preserve order and enforce the law (Bittner, 1970; Reiss, 1971). The public’s 
perception of law enforcement’s ability to control crime while maintaining high levels of 
accountably and ethical standards is often framed around the use of force by police (Adams et 
al., 1999; GAO, 2005, Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005; Terrill, 2005). 
During the past few decades, several incidents of excessive use of police force have 
garnered local, national, and international media attention. These incidents have cast police in a 
negative light and have altered the public’s perception of their use of force. Two notable 
examples include the 1991 Rodney King incident in Los Angeles and the 1999 shooting death of 
Amadou Diallo by New York City police officers (Belotto, 2001; Meyer, 1992). Both of these 
incidents galvanized public opinion on when and how much force law enforcement officers 
should use when encountering noncompliant or potentially violent suspects. 
To address the public’s perception of excessive use of force by officers in non-deadly 
force confrontations, many police agencies have adopted a variety of less-than-lethal alternatives 
for officers to employ when dealing with noncompliant suspects. The implementation of these 
less-than-lethal weapons was designed to provide officers with options to control suspects 
without inflicting permanent injury. The infliction of serious injuries to suspects during 
encounters with police is often a catalyst for citizen complaints, lawsuits, and increased scrutiny 
of police actions.   
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One of these alternatives is the conducted energy device (CED), also referred to as an 
electronic control weapon (ECW), or a taser (McBride & Tedder, 2005). This type of weapon 
has been used by police since the 1970s, but it has recently gained renewed popularity with the 
development of a new generation of products. Nationally, a limited number of deaths and injuries 
have occurred during taser use (McBride & Tedder, 2005, p.6). While the number of deaths is 
small when compared to overall taser uses many of these incidents have generated intense media 
coverage (Amnesty International, 1999, 2004). These cases are a clear indication that the lack of 
substantive research on the use and effects of taser technology leaves many unanswered 
questions for both the police and the public.  
Police officers are authorized to use force in very specific circumstances; these are 
dictated by agency policies and are sanctioned by state statutes and federal laws. Police also 
receive extensive training in use-of-force methods. Individual state policing standards guidelines 
mandate this training annually (GAO, 2005). Officers routinely encounter situations when use of 
force is appropriate (NIJ, 1998, p.38). Research by Adams et al. (1999) found that officers used 
or threatened force in only a small percentage of police-citizen encounters based on survey 
responses from citizens. Most of these encounters involve a limited use of force, such as 
detaining, handcuffing, and searching suspects, prior to making arrests (Adams et. al., 1999; 
Garner & Maxwell, 1999; McLaughlin, 1992; Stetser, 2001; Terrill, 2001). Limited force may 
also be used with suspects who are noncompliant or combative (Croft, 1986); typical examples 
include restraining unruly combatants, confronting armed suspects, or controlling disruptive 
demonstrators (Garner, Buchanan, Schrade & Hepbern, 1996; McLaughlin, 1992). When 
suspects are only resisting the actions or commands of officers but not physically resisting in use 
of force encounters they are only offering passive level resistance. When that resistance escalates 
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to physical movements to either resist the actions of the officer or escape, this escalation is 
considered active physical resistance. This distinction is one of the key elements of this study 
and this terminology has been used by many police agencies to describe levels of resistance 
when developing use-of-force guidelines and policies.  
Research by Adams et al. (1999) has shown that most police use of force involves the use 
of weaponless tactics, such as grabbing or holding, to control suspects. Police typically use force 
when they are trying to make an arrest and the suspect resists. Police use weapons in about  two 
percent of all arrests (Adams et al., 1999). The weapon most frequently used was chemical spray 
(1.2 percent of all arrests). Firearms were the least often used (0.2 percent) (Adams et al., 1999).  
 According to Adams et al. (1999), “The kinds of police actions that most arouse the 
public’s concerns—such as fatal shootings, severe beatings with fists or batons that lead to 
hospitalization, and choke holds that cause unconsciousness or even death—are not the typical 
situations in which police use force” (p.5). Most injuries that occur as a result of the use of force 
are more likely to be minor such as bruises or abrasions (Adams et al., 1999; Alpert & Dunham, 
1997; Lundstrom & Mullan, 1987).  
 Most police officers are trained to use force incrementally along a Use-of-Force 
Continuum (Alpert & Dunham, 1997; Conner, 1991; Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 
1995; McLaughlin, 1992; Terrill, 2003). Supreme Court decisions and police policies dictate that 
officers use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish their mission (Graham vs. 
Connor (109 S.Ct.1986 [1989]). Part of this progression in force involves the incremental 
application of a variety of use-of-force tools and tactics designed to counter or defeat the 
resistance of a suspect. The number and sophistication of these tools has increased significantly 
over the last few decades. Historically, officers only had their hands or nightsticks to use before 
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escalating to firearms. Modern force continuums contain several other measures or tools to 
employ prior to using deadly force. Many of these alternatives are new technologies developed 
to provide options for officers to use in specific situations. The Use-of-Force Continuum 
provides a guide for the incremental and proportional use of these options when encountering 
resistance (Bittner, 1970; Conner, 1991; Terrill, 2001, 2003). Table 1 provides an example of a 
Use-of-Force Continuum. A short history of these alternatives is then provided. 
 
Table 1: Use-of-Force Continuum  
Use-of-Force Continuum 
Suspect resistance Officer use of force 
1. No resistance 1. Officer Presence   
2. Verbal noncompliance  2. Verbal commands  
3. Passive resistance  3. Hands-on tactics, Chemical spray 
4. Active resistance  4. Intermediate weapons: Baton, Taser,  
     Strikes, Non-deadly force 
5. Aggressive resistance   5. Intermediate weapons-Intensified techniques, 
    Non-deadly force  
6. Deadly force resistance   6. Deadly force 
Adapted from the Orlando Police Department’s Resistance and Response Continuum and (Terrill, 2003) 
 
The Application of Technology to Police Use of Force 
 Police leaders have most often looked to technology to address public concerns resulting 
from police/citizen confrontations that require use of force. The technologies typically sought are 
less-than-lethal alternatives to the more traditional means of controlling suspects, such as impact 
weapons or weaponless tactics (Villa & Morris, 1999). These alternatives were once only 
available to special weapons teams who dealt with barricaded suspects, making high-risk 
apprehensions, or controlling large-scale civil disturbances (Bailey, 1996). In the last few 
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decades, however, police have systematically mainstreamed these weapons into the conventional 
police workforce. Prior to the introduction of these less-than-lethal alternatives, officers had very 
limited ways of escalating from empty-handed tactics to deadly force.   
 Impact weapons, such as the nightstick or billy club, have been used for centuries by 
police (Villa & Morris, 1999). Variants of the baton or nightstick became popular with law 
enforcement in the 1980s and early 1990s. These include side-handled and expandable batons 
(Truncale, 1996). The public outcry after the Rodney King beating by Los Angeles police in 
1991 focused on the baton as a brutal, barbaric, and antiquated police weapon (Meyer, 1992).  
 While police continue to carry and use impact weapons, the focus of police research and 
manufacturers of use-of-force technology has shifted to developing less-than-lethal weapons that 
reduce the frequency of permanent injuries and allow officers to incapacitate suspects while still 
maintaining a safe distance (Bleetman, 2004). These modern and sophisticated offerings, such as 
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) sprays; conducted energy devices, such as tasers or stun guns; and 
bean bag projectiles, achieve this goal with varying degrees of success and reduced amounts of 
unintended or unnecessary injuries (Lumb & Friday, 1997; McBride & Tedder, 2005).   
The Use of Chemical Spray by Police 
The use of chemical sprays by police officers began in the 1980s. These weapons 
immediately gained popularity as alternatives to impact weapons or empty-handed tactics to gain 
compliance. Chemical sprays inflict less traumatic injuries than impact weapons, and they are 
seen as a less violent way of addressing noncompliant or violent offenders (Kaminski, Edwards, 
& Johnson, 1998, 1999; Morabito & Doerner, 1997). 
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 While generally seen as effective by the police, certain types of chemical sprays have 
been criticized for being linked to deaths of suspects, and they are also susceptible to 
inappropriate use by officers (Lumb & Friday, 1997). Research into the effectiveness of 
chemical sprays has validated, to some extent, their use. Several studies of OC spray use by 
police agencies have documented higher rates of incapacitation and a reduction of injuries to 
suspects (Alpert & Smith, 2000; Kaminski et al., 1998; 1999; Morabito & Doerner, 1997).  
A two-year study by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found that of the 899 
subjects exposed to OC spray none of the subjects suffered ill effects or adverse reactions 
(Weaver, 1989). In the early 1990s, there were claims that pepper spray was implicated as a 
contributing factor in some in-custody deaths. OC spray can compromise breathing in some 
people who may suffer from asthma or other breathing ailments (Kaminski, et al, 1998). In 
response to those claims, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) conducted a study of the pepper spray use by police and related 
in-custody deaths. The study’s findings were that pepper spray alone was not the cause of the 
deaths.  The study identified that positional asphyxia, the positioning of the suspect’s body 
during transport or detention, subsequent to the use of spray may have been a contributing factor 
in these cases (NIJ, 1998).    
The principal criticism of chemical spray, from police officer’s perspective, is from the 
overspray that occurs when the chemical is deployed (NIJ, 1998). Officers are exposed 
frequently to the chemicals from the spray while securing or transporting suspects or from 
inhaling the fumes that are suspended in the air after a deployment. This can potentially 
incapacitate them and put them at risk for being disarmed or overpowered. In addition, innocent 
bystanders or assisting officers also can be the unintended recipient of overspray (Adkins, 2003). 
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The accuracy of chemical sprays is much less than that of conventional firearms (Adang & 
Mensink, 2004; Bowling & Gaines, 2000). 
The Use of Conducted Energy Devices by Police 
 Conducted energy devices encompass a wide range of weapons that rely on electrical 
shock to incapacitate combative and/or noncompliant suspects. These include stun guns, stun 
belts, electronic control weapons, and tasers (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). These weapons are 
the latest developments in a succession of less-than-lethal products developed and employed by 
both police and the military (McEwen, 1997; Meyer, 1992).   
 There are primarily two types of electronic control weapons. The first type of these 
weapons uses two metal probes that are pressed directly into the skin or clothing of a suspect. 
These are designated direct contact weapons. When the probes on the front of the weapon make 
contact this completes a circuit that delivers an electrical shock to the suspect. This electrical 
charge debilitates the suspect by convulsing muscles and momentarily disrupting the central 
nervous system (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). The second type of device fires two darts with 
hooks connected to the weapon by thin wires which conduct the electric charge (Nielsen, 2001). 
When the darts penetrate the suspect’s skin or clothing, a circuit is completed and an electrical 
charge is delivered (Williams, 2001). 
 The primary benefit of these weapons is that they typically incapacitate a suspect very 
quickly. Direct contact stun weapons incapacitate suspects by causing pain and loss of muscle 
control. This control is only maintained while the weapon is in direct contact with the suspect.  
These weapons  require the operator to remain in close contact with the suspect during the 
encounter. This can be potentially dangerous for the operator when the weapon is disengaged 
 7
   
and the suspect must then be secured (Kornblum, 1991). This is the same problem that was 
discussed with the use of OC spray. Officers who are in close proximity to suspects during an 
encounter can be exposed unintentionally to overspray (Adkins, 2003).   
 The incapacitating effect of the dart-firing electrical shocking device can be 
instantaneous, and it lasts for several seconds. This is usually sufficient time to allow the suspect 
to be properly restrained. The dart-firing device also can be reactivated repeatedly if more time is 
required for restraint or backup. “Once the flow of electrical current stops, the suspect recovers 
rapidly, generally from several seconds to a few minutes” (Nielson, 2001, p.61).   
 One of the main benefits of direct contact conducted energy devices is that they can be 
used in a confined space. The maximum range for these weapons is the length of the arm of the 
person employing it. The dart firing weapons have a maximum range of 15 to 21 feet. The barbs 
can be discharged at very close range, but are most effective at a minimum distance of  3 feet 
from the operator. These weapons rely on the same “point, aim, and shoot” technique used in 
traditional firearms training. They are small, portable and can be fired with only one hand 
(Nielson, 2001, p.59).   
The Introduction of Tasers as a Less-than-Lethal Alternative for Police 
 TASER is an acronym for Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle, named after Tom Swift, of the 
popular American Children’s adventure series of the 1920s and 1930s (IACP, 2004). Taser 
technology has been used by law enforcement agencies since 1974 (GAO, 2005; Nielson, 2001). 
The device was invented by Jack Cover, a NASA scientist who had experimented with electricity 
as a non-deadly weapon during the 1960s. The original versions of the taser used gunpowder to 
fire the electronic probes and, therefore, were classified as firearms under the 1968 Gun Control 
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Act (IACP, 2004). Cover discovered that immediate incapacitation almost always occurred with 
no other direct negative side effects when tasers were applied to human beings in short duration 
(Griffith, 2002; Nielson, 2001).   
 Modern tasers have been modified significantly to address design flaws and to improve 
reliability and effectiveness (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; GAO, 2005). The latest models feature 
a nitrogen gas propulsion system that fires two darts from a maximum distance of 21 feet, at 200-
220 feet per second. The probes impact and penetrate ¼ inch into clothing or bare skin, 
delivering 10-20 pulses per second of 50,000 volts of electrical shock. The recipient feels a series 
of “rabbit punches” or “boxer’s jabs” (Vogel, 1998, p. 49). Each of these shocks ensures the 
target suspect is “off balance, confused, and unable to aggress while the recipient of the action” 
(p. 49). The electric charge, which causes an interruption of the recipient’s neuromuscular 
messages and muscle contractions, seeks a path of least resistance to reach the companion dart 
(Vogel, 1998).  
The Controversy Surrounding Taser Use by Police 
The use of tasers by police is not without criticism. Since their inception as a less-than- 
lethal alternative for police, tasers have evoked strong reactions from those who oppose their use 
(Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; McBride & Tedder, 2005). Many critics of tasers compare their 
use to the use of electronic cattle prods as implements of torture. Both tasers and batons were 
used by Los Angeles police officers during the Rodney King beating incident (Meyer, 1992). 
This incident and the violence that ensued from this use-of-force encounter became a focal point 
for criticism of the police over excessive force issues. One of the primary issues with taser use is 
when officers should be authorized to use them. The Use-of-Force Continuum is the mechanism 
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that guides police use of force and establishes what level of resistance must be present before 
various use-of-force methods can be used (Conner, 1991). The interpretation of what is excessive 
in a given situation often is based on the placement of use-of-force methods on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum.  
During the last two decades, various articles from periodicals and newspapers have 
detailed the criticisms of the use of tasers by public safety agencies. A 1997 report by Amnesty 
International titled “Recent Cases of the Use of Electroshock Weapons for Torture or Ill-
Treatment” lists the United States in the same class as Algeria and China with respect to human 
rights violations (Amnesty International, 1997). The report alleges that the taser is misused by 
police during use-of-force incidents. “Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties 
Union both claim that these devices are unsafe and may actually encourage sadistic acts by 
police officers and prison guards” (Cusac, 1997, p.29). In 2004, Amnesty International called for 
a moratorium on the use of these weapons until an independent inquiry on the use and effects of 
the taser was conducted (Amnesty International, 2004). Even police agencies' opinions on the 
use of tasers by their officers conflict.  
A Milwaukee Police report noted that 70 percent of persons hit with tasers during a 12-
week period suffered some type of injury although none were serious (Diedrich, 2004). Statistics 
from the Los Angeles Police Department, compiled during a three-year period, show that tasers 
were effective at controlling suspects only 56% of the time (Hamilton, 2002). In Orange County, 
Florida, the sheriff office's use of tasers resulted in a decrease of OC spray and baton use by 
officers; however, the total number of use-of-force incidents increased by 58 percent over three 
years (Berenson, 2004). Citing concerns about the safety of tasers, the Department of Homeland 
Security has voiced its objection to deploying these devices to 20,000 agents in their two largest 
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law enforcement divisions, Customs Enforcement and Customs Border Protection (Wilkening, 
2005).  
The Medical Controversy Surrounding the Use of Tasers 
The medical community also is conflicted about the potential harmful effects of taser use. 
A February 2002 Time Magazine article cited a medical review conducted at the Cleveland 
Clinic. Dr. Patrick Tchou, a cardiologist, reviewed the few existing scientific studies on stun 
guns and concluded that there is “…some potential for harm, such as irregular heart beat, that 
could lead to death” (Hamilton, 2002, p. 50). According to Amnesty International, more than 150 
people have died after being shocked by tasers (Berenson, 2006). This claim is adamantly denied 
by Taser International, a leading manufacturer of taser products (TASER International, 2004). 
According to a July 19, 2004, Taser International press release, “The fact is that TASER devices 
have never been named as the primary cause of death in any in-custody death, and any links as a 
contributing factor are subjective and unsupported by clear evidence” (p.2).   
Amnesty International's claim is also refuted by the United Kingdom’s Defense Scientific 
Advisory Council’s subcommittee on the medical implications of less-than-lethal weapons. That 
study concluded that the risk of life threatening or serious injuries from the M26 Advanced Taser 
appears to be very low (DOMILL, 2004). Research supports that many of the deaths associated 
with the use of tasers involved subjects exhibiting signs of stimulant or alcohol use when 
engaged in confrontations with the police. This phenomenon has been labeled “excited 
delirium,” a condition brought on by physical exertion or stress during a physical struggle in 
combination with these substances in the body (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; Fish & Geddes, 
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2001; Kornblum, 1991; Marks, 2005; OCSO task force, 2005). This finding is not unexpected as 
many suspects are under the influence of substances when encountered by police. 
The use of tasers in combination with chemical sprays also has generated public concern. 
Early forms of pepper spray contained mixtures that contained flammable materials, such as 
isopropyl alcohol, dymel, and methylene chloride (NIJ, 1998, p.43). These mixtures created 
controversy during a 1991 incident involving New York City Police officers who used the taser 
on a barricaded subject after chemical spray failed to subdue him. The subject caught fire when 
hit by the taser’s electric current, which ignited the flammable mixture from the spray (Jett, 
1997). 
Proponents of Taser Use 
The popularity of the taser with law enforcement agencies is clearly on the rise. 
According to Taser International, the weapons are used by almost 10,000 police departments in 
the United States and abroad (Berenson, 2006). According the Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF) the use of stun technology by law enforcement agencies has increased significantly since 
1999 (PERF, 2005). This increase can be attributed to an influx of a newer generation of taser 
weapons that are being aggressively marketed to police agencies (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). 
Sales figures for TASER International Inc., the principal supplier of tasers to law enforcement 
agencies, indicate the company’s revenue has increased from around “$2.2 million in 1999, to an 
estimated $67 million for fiscal year 2004” (McBride & Tedder, 2005, p.8). Across the United 
States, police agencies are purchasing and equipping their officers with the newest taser 
products. Presently, about 130,000 officers in 7,000 police departments are armed with tasers 
and, in some cities, such as Miami and Phoenix, every police officer is equipped with a taser 
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(Wilkening, 2005). According to the United States General Accounting Office (2005), tasers 
have been deployed in 70,000 actual field uses during police encounters.  
Taser proponents concede that the effects of these weapons can be unpleasant but argue 
that the number of deaths that might be attributed to the stun gun pales in comparison to the 
30,000 or so Americans who are killed each year by gunshot wounds (Cronin & Ederheimer, 
2006). Taser International CEO Rick Smith states “what our weapon does is unpleasant but it can 
save lives” (Hamilton, 2002, p. 50).  
 The primary reason for the renewed popularity of the taser is related directly to the 
improvements in the design and reliability of newer models (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). 
Statistics related to the ability of tasers to control resistive suspects range from “33% ineffective 
(Commissioner Howard Safir, NYPD) to 85% effective (per manufacturer Tasertron)” (Nielsen, 
2001, p. 57). Early taser models were less powerful, operating in the 5 to 14 watt range, as 
opposed to more modern tasers, which generate 18 to 26 watts of power. This increased power is 
able to defeat or overcome even the most determined adversary (Nielsen, 2001).  
The latest models are smaller and more portable, making them easier to be carried by 
uniformed officers. These models also contain an internal memory that can be accessed by 
computer to determine the time, date, and number of taser deployments during a use-of-force 
encounter. This memory provides police agencies a measure of control and accountability when 
investigating allegations of misconduct with tasers by their officers (Nielsen, 2001).   
The use of tasers in Central Florida, which includes the study site the Orlando Police 
Department (OPD), has been the subject of considerable media coverage. The use of tasers by 
OPD officers as well as other area police agencies has been widely reported on by the mass 
media. This media coverage has fueled the public controversy over the use of tasers in low level 
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or passive resistance confrontations.  This controversy has motivated agencies to change their 
policies on the use of tasers in these low intensity or passive resistance encounters to restrict and 
mitigate taser use. These policy changes and their effect on taser usage and officer attitudes 
about taser use after these changes are the focus of this study. 
The Benefits of Proposed Research 
The purpose of this study is to examine an organizational policy change on the use of 
tasers as a less-lethal alternative for police. Since the introduction of the Use-of-Force 
Continuum in the late 1980’s, police have used variants to guide officers’ use of force (Conner, 
1991). The Use-of-Force Continuum acts as a guide for the officer to incrementally and 
proportionally increase or decrease the type and amount of force used against noncompliant or 
combative suspects based on the level of resistance encountered (Conner, 1991; Garner et al. 
1996; Stetser 2001; Terrill, 2001, 2003). 
The controversy over where the taser should be placed on the Use-of-Force Continuum is 
the impetus for the policy change.  The change raised the level of resistance needed to authorize 
taser use. Whether suspects must be actively resisting or only passively resisting the actions of 
officers before tasers should be used is the critical issue among many in law enforcement circles. 
This study examines this issue by analyzing archival use-of-force data before and after a police 
department changed their policy and raised the level of force necessary to use tasers on suspects 
showing passive to active resistance.   
The study site for this research was the Orlando Police Department (OPD) in Orlando, 
Florida. This agency is a  mid to large sized municipal police agency located in the southeast 
United States. The agency employs over 700 sworn officers.  OPD serves a rapidly growing and 
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diverse population of over 217,000 residents (FDLE, 2005). In 2001, the agency adopted the 
taser as a less than lethal use-of-force method. The use of the taser was initially authorized in 
situations where suspects were offering passive resistance to officers during arrests and 
encounters. Almost immediately, local media reports highlighted the use of tasers on suspects 
who were only passively resisting officers and the deployment of tasers on children in school 
disturbances. Five suspects who were shot with tasers by Orange County police agencies (1 by 
OPD officers and 4 by Orange County Sheriff’s Office (OCSO) deputies) subsequently died 
while in police custody (Colarossi, Leusner & Moore, 2006). This controversy led to the 
formation of citizen committees that reviewed taser use by both the OPD and the OCSO and 
made recommendations (OCSO Task Force, 2005). In June 2004, Orange County Sheriff Kevin 
Beary conducted a televised demonstration of taser use. He allowed himself to be shot with a 
taser as a demonstration of the safety of the taser as a less-than-lethal weapon. Also in June 
2004, the Chief of Police in Orlando changed  his agency’s use of force policy, raising the 
authorized level for deployment of the taser from passive to active resistance. It is this change 
and the effect on taser deployments that are the subject of this study. These events demonstrate 
the climate of public and media interest in taser usage in the Central Florida area during the 
Summer of 2004.  The influence that this attention had on taser use by officers and policy 
decisions by police leaders cannot be understated or accurately measured. 
If taser deployments fell after the change in organizational policy, it provides evidence 
that not only are officers using this weapon in accordance with policy but also that the placement 
of electronic control weapons use may actually be placed correctly in the Use-of-Force 
Continuum associated with active resistance. However, if there was no change in the use of 
tasers (controlling for situational exigencies), it may indicate that, despite the change in policy, 
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the police culture in this jurisdiction (and possibly others) may be stronger than policy directives 
handed down by the administrative cadre. To conduct this analysis, the research examines 
archival records in the period before and after the change in policy and officers were asked 
directly how this policy has changed their use patterns. It is hoped that this combination of 
methods will allow this research to blaze a new path in research that will match police practice, 
culture, and administrative policy directives.   
To better understand police use of tasers and to examine what constitutes its effectiveness 
as a less-than-lethal weapon, it is necessary to review the literature related to not just police 
weapons, but also to the role of police and the issue of police use of force. This examination will 
provide a short summary of the evolving police mission and the role of technology in how police 
deal with the issue of use of force. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Overview 
The evolution of policing in America has exposed a myriad of problems and challenges 
for police leaders and criminal justice practitioners (Vila & Morris, 1999). The vast majority of 
these problems and challenges have been created by the constantly evolving nature of the police 
mission, the increasing demands placed on police, and the sometimes unrealistic expectations of 
the public (Wadman & Allison, 2004). An examination of the historical progression of policing 
reveals a litany of problems and public scrutiny involving policing tactics (Kelling & Wycoff, 
2001). Many of these problems were exacerbated by the lack of professionalism of police leaders 
and their cultural and institutional resistance to change (Bayley & Mendelsohn, 1969; Vila & 
Morris, 1999). One of the fundamental issues confronting police administrators is directing, 
controlling, and monitoring the use of force by their officers (Bittner, 1970; Fyfe, 1988). This 
issue has occupied the public’s interest and has contributed to a climate of distrust and animosity 
between the police and the public they serve (Belotto, 2001). Many of these incidents involve the 
use of deadly force to apprehend or control offenders (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989). As 
advancements in technology created more less-than-lethal (LTL) options for officers in use-of-
force confrontations, police administrators quickly grasped at them as a potential solution for 
these issues (Bleetman, 2004). These options afforded officers a wider variety of methods to 
control suspects without having to resort to more controversial, violent, or deadly forms of force 
(NIJ, 1998). Often, these LTL options lacked the practical research or rigorous evaluation to 
support their deployment. In some incidences, this led to unintended harm to suspects or abuses 
by officers that have been highlighted by the mass media (Belotto, 2001; Amnesty International, 
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1999, 2004). This negative publicity has led to calls from the public for reform and reevaluation 
of these methods.   
The latest offering in LTL alternatives for police is the taser. Although the police have 
been using the taser since the 1970s, the newest models are more powerful and effective at 
rendering uncontrollable suspects compliant while minimizing officer and suspect injuries (NIJ, 
1998; GAO, 2005). Since the mid 1990s, police agencies have been issuing tasers to officers at a 
record pace (GAO, 2005).   
What is less prevalent in the empirical research is if public perception and civil litigation 
led to the policy changes that attempt to alter when officers are authorized to use electronic 
control devices. Additionally, more research is needed to determine if introducing these policy 
changes have had any substantial effect on the frequency of taser use, officer and suspect 
injuries, or the levels of resistance offered by noncompliant suspects.    
Police Use of Force 
To fulfill their crime fighting and order maintenance roles, police must use force to 
restore order, take charge, or capture and control noncompliant suspects (Bittner, 1970, 1990). 
Incidents of force have frequently sparked criticism and controversy (Kelling & Wycoff, 2001). 
In an effort to improve their public image and mitigate their exposure to civil liability, police 
agencies have frequently sought out technology as a solution (NIJ, 1998).  
In the late 1980s, Supreme Court rulings spurred changes in police procedure, prohibiting 
the use of deadly force simply to stop fleeing suspects. In a 1985 decision, Tennessee vs. Garner 
(471 1 US [1985]), the Supreme Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, when a law 
enforcement officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, deadly force may only be used to prevent 
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escape and only when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others (Tennessee v. Garner, 
1985). In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled in Graham vs. Connor (109 S.Ct.1986 [1989]) that an 
officer’s decision regarding the level of force to use must be judged from the perspective of the 
reasonable person and be based on the circumstances, which are often rapidly evolving and 
unclear.  
These landmark rulings set the standards for the Use-of-Force Continuum and for how 
and when police should apply force. The court recognized that officers must be able to escalate, 
or deescalate, levels of force to match the level of resistance presented by suspects in 
police/citizen encounters based on the standard of “objective reasonableness.” While these 
rulings were instructive for police, they also forced police to explore new ways to capture or 
control suspects in these types of situations (Pliant, 1993). The standard of objective 
reasonableness is a generalized standard and is not universally understood or interpreted. This 
ambiguity has forced police agencies to adopt LTL policies to guide officers in use of force 
encounters that more clearly define and articulate what is reasonable force in a given set of 
circumstances.   
To meet these legally imposed mandates, police agencies have relied strongly on 
technology to expand their options when dealing with uncooperative or noncompliant suspects. 
This point is made clear by the inclusion of many of these new control devices in a given 
agency’s Use-of-Force Continuum. The goal of the continuum, and the placement of these tactics 
within it, is to reduce the amount of force used by officers and to lower the risk of unintentional 
or serious injuries to suspects or officers. Despite the recent focus on technology to control the 
amount of force used in specific situations, technology has a long history of shaping the practices 
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of the police. Despite an evolution in the responsibilities placed on the police, the essential role 
of protecting the public has not changed that much since they were first founded in this country. 
The police are charged with the maintenance of order and enforcing laws. They are also seen as 
one of the most visible and powerful arms of government (Bittner, 1990). The use of force to 
advance the aims of government has always been controversial and subjective. A brief discussion 
of this topic is presented to provide substantive background to this issue and to clarify its 
relevance to this study.  
The Role of Police in Modern Society 
Throughout their history, police have been forced to continually reassess their role, 
develop new ways to fulfill their mission, and adapt in an ever-changing social and political 
environment. Today, police are faced with a continually expanding role in domestic security in a 
post 9/11 world (Wadman & Allison, 2004).  
Historically, the solutions most often sought by police to meet the changing demands of 
the public have been grounded in new technologies to advance the delivery of police services. 
Despite the many technological advancements made for and by police, use of force remains a 
topic of debate and controversy. Often, the public’s perception of the ability of police to maintain 
order and control crime is framed by these limited and random occurrences (Adams, et al., 
1999).   
In a study of the functions of police, noted criminal justice scholar Egon Bittner proposed 
that “the police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified 
force in society “(1970, p. 39). Bittner states that most police work involves stopping 
“something- that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-somebody-had-better-do-
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something- now” (Bittner, 1970; p. 39). This statement identifies the core of the debate on how 
much force police should use to bring order to chaos. Bittner (1970) recognized that excessive, 
unnecessary, or minimal use of force by police is very difficult to define or quantify.    
In an attempt to provide some standards or guidance on when officers should use force, 
Bittner (1990) posited that because criminal law is vague, police administrators have developed 
taxonomies of force to guide their officer’s conduct. Often, these taxonomies are manifested by 
“use-of-force continua,” which provide a guide for officers on the types and amount of force that 
can be used in a given situation (Klinger, 1995).   
In addressing the debate over why injuries to suspects are a natural byproduct of the 
police function, Bittner (1990) characterizes police as “the fire it takes to fight fire and that they 
in the natural course of their duties inflict harm, albeit deserved” (p.96). Unfortunately, the 
nature of police work is that harm is sometimes inflicted, despite the best efforts of police to 
control events and behavior. Police are most often called upon to interdict or stop some act of 
violence, unwanted behavior, or threat to public safety. This preemptive action is almost always 
spontaneous and not necessarily conceived by the officer. The outcome of this action is often 
reviewed extensively by others, both internally by police managers and by the public, typically 
filtered by media reports. These reviews have often raised questions and concerns about when 
and how much force was used to quell a disturbance or take a suspect into custody. The 
difference in perceptions of the public and police as to what exactly constitutes justified force 
contributes significantly to this debate. According to Bittner (1990): 
Though it is expected that policemen will be judicious and that experience and skill will 
guide them in the performance of their work, it is foolish to expect that they could always 
be swift and subtle. Nor is it reasonable to demand that they prevail, where they are 
supposed to prevail while hoping that they will always handle resistance gently (p. 97).  
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For some members of the public, politicians and some police administrators, the simple 
solution is to use less force. Fyfe (1987) discusses the negative consequences of both 
unnecessary force by officers and the consequences of insufficient use of force by police. The 
use of unnecessary force by police can lead to significant negative consequences, to include 
unnecessary injuries to the suspect or death, community complaints, distrust of the police, civil 
liability, civil unrest, and federal injunctive orders. Insufficient use of force exposes officers to 
harm or death, negatively affects an officer’s ability to enforce the law, and increases the danger 
to public safety. Fyfe (1987) concludes that unnecessary force “could be avoided by measures 
such as better training, officer selection, and other use-of-force options” (p.6). 
Much of the research and policy emphasis by police has focused on reduction of harm to 
officers and suspects in use-of-force confrontations. This objective forms the basis of the 
development of use-of-force alternatives. Use of force by police is an integral part of police 
work. It remains a point of controversy and debate for police practitioners and criminal justice 
scholars. A brief summary of this research is provided. 
The Research on Police Use of Force 
 Police are one of the few institutions of government authorized to use force (Bittner, 
1970; Fyfe, 1988). The use of force by police to compel conformance to law is at the very core 
of their mission and purpose (Bittner, 1970). Through the use of various methods, such as field 
observations (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1988; Terrill, 2001), conducting 
surveys of officers (Garner et al., 1995; Lundstrom & Millan, 1987), and examining agency use-
of-force data (Alpert & Dunham, 1997, 1999; Kavanagh, 1994; Meyer, 1992; Morabito & 
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Doerner, 1997), researchers have attempted to determine the extent to which police use and 
misuse force (Ederheimer & Fridell, 2005).  
Various studies have also attempted to identify situational, individual and community 
level factors to explain why officers use force (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1980; 
Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Worden, 1995; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill, 2003). There is 
also a considerable body of research examining the area of deadly force; specifically, police use 
of deadly force by firearms (Binder & Fridell, 1984; Fyfe, 1979; 1980; 1988; Geller & Scott, 
1992).    
Generally, research on non-deadly police use of force is grouped into two distinct areas. 
These include studies on authorized police use of force (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 
1980; Fyfe, 1988) and studies on unauthorized use of force by police (Bayley & Mendelsohn, 
1969; Fyfe, 1980; Geller & Toch, 1995). Research on non-lethal force suffers from the same 
shortcomings as the research on lethal force; namely, an inability to define adequately what 
constitutes reasonable or excessive force (Bittner, 1970: 1990;Garner et al., 1995) (See Table 2). 
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Table 2: Studies of Police Use of Force  
Author(s) Nature of sample Data Date Data type 
Fredrich  (1980) 1,565 police citizen encounters in 
DC, Boston, and Chicago. 
(Reexamination of Reiss, 1969) 
1966 Observational 
data 
Croft (1985) 2,397 uses of force from 123,500 
arrests made by Rochester, NY police 
1973-1979 Use of force 
forms 
Fyfe (1989) 2,142 violent encounters in Dade 
County FL.  
1985 to 1986 Observational 
data 
Lundstrom & 
Mullan (1987) 
11,989 custody situations in St. Paul, 
Minn.  
March 1985 - 
February 1986 
Officers' use-
of-force forms 
Bayley & Garafalo 
(1989) 
467 police citizen encounters in NYC  Summer 1986 Observational 
data 
Meyer (1992) 568 use-of-force incidents involving  
LAPD officers 
1989 Use of force 
forms 
McLaughlin 
(1992) 
11,000 arrests by Savannah GA. 
Police 
1989 Use of force 
forms 
Pate & Fridell 
(1993) 
1,111 law enforcement agencies were 
surveyed on the use of all types of 
weapons and citizens' complaints 
1991 Agency 
surveys 
Kavanagh (1997) 1,108 arrests made at the NY port 
authority bus terminal  
1990-1991 Arrest Reports 
Garner et al. 
(1995) 
1585 arrests in Phoenix, AZ. 1994 Use of force 
forms 
Worden (1995) 5,688 police citizen encounters in St. 
Louis, Missouri; Rochester, NY; and 
Tampa, FL 
1977 Observational 
data 
Alpert & Dunham 
(1997) 
676 Use of force incidents in Miami-
Dade County, FL 
1997-1998 Use of force 
forms 
Lumb & Friday 
(1997) 
61 Use of force incidents in  
Concord, NC  
July1992-
December 1993 
Use of force 
forms 
Morabito & 
Doerner (1997) 
999 Use-of- force encounters in 
Tallahassee, FL 
1993-1995 Use of force 
forms 
Kaminski et al. 
(1999) 
878 OC Spray incidents in Baltimore 
County, MD 
1993-1996 Survey data 
Terrill (2001) 3,544 police encounters with suspects 
in St. Petersburg, FL and 
Indianapolis, IN  
St. Petersburg,FL 
(Summer 1997) 
and Indianapolis, 
IN (Summer 
1996) 
Observational 
data 
Terrill & 
Mastrofski (2002) 
3,544 police encounters with suspects 
in St. Petersburg, FL and 
Indianapolis, IN  
St. Petersburg,FL 
(Summer) 1997 
and Indianapolis, 
IN (Summer 
1996) 
Observational 
data 
 24
   
Studies Examining the Factors That Influence Use of Force 
 Friedrich (1980), using Reiss’ (1969) observational data, examined what factors most 
significantly influence police use of force. He determined that the traditional factors that had 
been previously regarded as having an effect on police use of force (such as situational and 
organizational factors) were, in fact, not significant. Friedrich determined that situational 
characteristics of encounters, such as race, gender, social class, and suspect demeanor, were 
more predictive of police use of force. 
 Garner, Buchanan, Schrade, and Hepbern (1995) examined 1,585 officer surveys of use 
of force and conducted 185 interviews of suspects involved in use-of-force incidents. The 
surveys captured specific situational characteristics relevant to the officers’ use of force. The 
suspects in these incidents were interviewed to provide insight into the dynamics of how the 
force was used. The study’s findings supported the notion that police use force very infrequently 
when compared to the number of arrests made. The study found that 1 in 5 arrests required police 
to use some physical force. Suspects offered resistance in 1 of every 6 arrests. Police use 
weapons in 2 percent of all arrests. A blunt force impact weapon was the weapon most 
frequently used (12 times in 1,585 arrests). The study found that the single best predictor of 
police use of force was suspect use of force (Garner et al., 1996).    
Kavanagh (1997) studied arrest records from resisting arrest incidents during 1990 and 
1991 at the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal. This study identified that the arrestee’s 
behavior prior to resisting the officer’s attempts to arrest was most closely associated with the 
officer’s need to use force. These behaviors included disrespect of the officer, alcohol 
intoxication, and the seriousness of the original crime charged. The significance of this research 
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is that it supports the finding that officers play a much smaller role in the occurrence of resisting 
arrest than previously thought. 
Terrill (2001), using observational data from 3,544 police citizen encounters during the 
summers of 1996 and 1997 in St. Petersburg, Florida and Indianapolis, Indiana, developed the 
idea of using force factor scores. These scores assess not only the highest level of suspect 
resistance and use of force within an incident but also include all instances of resistance and 
force that take place. This study found that encounters that began with some form of force 
resulted in a greater frequency of subsequent suspect resistance and an increased use of 
additional force at some later point in the encounters.  This study underscores the importance of 
understanding police use of force relative to suspect resistance (Terrill, 2005). 
 Terrill and Mastrofski (2002), analyzing the same observational data from police citizen 
encounters in St, Petersburg and Indianapolis, concluded that police used more force against 
non-white, younger, poorer, or intoxicated suspects who resisted police authority. Police use of 
force was statistically unrelated to angry, disrespectful, or mentally impaired suspects.   
The Prevalence of Force in Police-Citizen Encounters 
The public’s confidence level of police agencies can be greatly altered by a single 
incident of police use-of-force abuse. For this reason, police have sought to regulate use of force 
by officers by providing policies and guidelines that outline a steady progression of the levels of 
force that must be applied to gain compliance. Frequently, these levels are based on various 
weapons and methods authorized to respond to a corresponding level of resistance by suspects.  
Examinations of police use-of-force reports, excessive use-of-force complaints, and citizen or 
officer surveys all affirm the low incidence of police use of force in encounters with citizens 
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(Adams, et al., 1999; Garner & Maxwell, 1999). However, each of these research methodologies 
has their specific strengths and weaknesses (Pate & Fridell, 1993). Observational studies have 
sometimes been criticized for not generating sufficient data (Garner et. al, 1995). However, more 
recent work by Terrill buffers this criticism (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill, 2003). Data on 
excessive force complaints can only provide indirect measures of actual behavior. Surveys and 
interviews tend to measure perceptions of force or excessive force, which may differ from actual 
events (Garner, Maxwell & Heraux, 2002). Scenario-based surveys typically do not capture 
accurate responses of what officers would really do in specific situations (Alpert & Smith, 1999). 
Agency-generated use-of-force data is often biased towards a best-case depiction of events, or it 
presents an agency-biased perspective (Garner et. al, 1995).     
The question of how infrequently police use force has generated considerable debate 
among professionals. In an observational study of the frequency of the use of non-lethal force by 
New York police officers, Bayley and Garafalo (1989) found that officers used physical force 
with citizens in only 8 percent of the 467 documented encounters. This study supports other 
research findings in that the use of force is rare in police-citizen encounters, although their study 
did not distinguish between what is reasonable and unreasonable force.   
Croft (1985) examined forms relating to the use of force that were completed by 
Rochester, New York, officers during a six-year period. This research indicated that physical 
force was only used against citizens in 2,397 of the 123,500 arrests made during the examination 
period. This reinforced the notion that police use force rarely in encounters with the public. 
Surprisingly, she found that the vast majority (80%) of the use-of-force incidents examined 
involved misdemeanors, violations, or no criminal situations.   
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Fyfe (1989) used observational data from a study of 2,412 potentially violent situations in 
Dade County, Florida. This study found that officers used force greater than a firm voice 
command in only 12 percent of use-of-force incidents. The greatest limitation of this study rests 
in its reliance on trained observers to make judgments about the levels of force used, making 
synthesis of the data difficult. 
McLaughlin (1992), relying on official use-of-force reports of arrests in Savannah, 
Georgia completed during 1989, discovered only 133 use-of-force incidents in over 11,000 
arrests. Of the 133 incidents, 45 involved instances in which officers punched or kicked citizens, 
11 in which officers struck citizens with a baton, and 2 in which officers sprayed citizens with 
mace. The results of this study concluded that police used force in as low as 1 percent of the 
cases examined.   
 Adams et al. (1999) using data from the 1996 pilot test of the PPCS (Police-Public 
Contact Survey) found that only about 1 percent of people reporting contacts with police said 
that officers used or threatened force. This research found that police used physical force in less 
than 20 percent of 7,512 arrests studied. Weaponless tactics such as grabbing or holding were 
primarily used.  Grabbing was the tactic used about one-half of the time. Police used weapons in 
only 2 percent of all arrests. When weapons were used, chemical sprays were the weapon of 
choice (1.2 percent of all arrests) with firearms least often used (0.2 percent).  
 Worden (1995), using observational data from a police services study in 60 
neighborhoods surrounding St. Louis, Missouri; Rochester, New York; and Tampa, Florida, 
reported that police used force in just over 1 percent of the nearly 5,700 police-citizen encounters 
observed. Further supporting the premise of low incidence of police use of force, Langen et al, 
(2001) cited findings from a 1999 Bureau of Justice Statistics national survey, which reported 
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that 1 percent of the people reporting face-to-face contact with the police experienced either 
force or the threat of force. However, most of the force was either threatened or at a low level.  
Terrill (2003) using data collected as part of an observational study of the police in 
Indianapolis, Indiana, and St. Petersburg, Florida, examined 3,544 police-suspect encounters in 
an attempt to better understand the application of non-lethal force and the relationship between 
officer use of force and suspect resistance. Terrill found that multiple uses of force and resistance 
within individual encounters increases the frequency of both behaviors. Most suspects display 
forceful and resistant behaviors which are typically on the lower end of continuum. When 
officers use greater levels of force early on, or any time, during an encounter the level of suspect 
resistance is also higher. This finding calls into question the utility of a “take charge” approach 
to maintaining control within police-suspect encounters. 
Injuries to Suspects in Police Use-of-Force Encounters 
Further research reveals that injuries to suspects from police actions occur very rarely and 
are often minor (Adams et al., 1999; Alpert & Dunham, 1997; Lundstrom & Mullan, 1987). 
Most studies on police use-of-force methods have examined injuries to suspects as a central 
component of their research (Alpert & Dunham 1998; Kaminski et al., 1999; Lumb & Friday, 
1997; Meyer, 1991; Morabito & Doerner, 1997). Much of the research on less-than-lethal 
weapons relates directly to the ability of these weapons to render uncooperative or combative 
suspects compliant without inflicting unnecessary injury or deaths.  
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Injuries to Officers in Use-of-Force Encounters 
  The reduction of officer injuries is one of the primary goals of policies governing use of 
force and it also is responsible for the advent of alternatives to traditional use-of-force methods. 
The effect on officer injuries from the use of LTL alternatives has been the subject of 
considerable research on LTL weapons (Alpert & Dunham 1998; Kaminski et al 1999; Lumb & 
Friday, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Morabito & Doerner, 1997) and police use of force in general 
(Garner et al. 1996; Garner and Maxwell, 1999; Terrill et al, 2003). Most of the research related 
to various use-of-force methods, such as chemical sprays (Kaminski et al, 1998), tasers 
(McManus et al. 2004; Hougland et al., 2005), or multiple use-of-force methods (McLaughlin, 
1992; Meyer, 1992) examine changes in the frequency of injuries to officers as a measure of 
effectiveness. 
The Police Use-of-Force Continuum 
Research also supports that officers are trained to use force progressively along a 
continuum (Alpert & Dunham, 1997; McLaughlin, 1992; Sykes & Brent, 1980; Terrill, 2001, 
2003; Terrill, Alpert, Dunham, & Smith, 2003). Supreme Court rulings, criminal statues, and 
police agencies’ use-of-force policies require that officers use only that level of force reasonably 
necessary to control or apprehend a suspect (Alpert & Dunham, 1997; Garner et al. 1996; 
Garner, Maxwell & Heraux, 2002; Graham v Conner, 1989).   
The escalation of police use of force is guided by a continuum based on a variety of 
methods and tools for officers to employ when resistance to their lawful authority is encountered 
(McLaughlin, 1992; Terrill, 2003; Terrill, Alpert, Dunham, & Smith, 2003). Terrill et al. (2003) 
identifies the Use-of-Force Continuum and the use-of-force reports as two of the “building 
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blocks to gauge and assess use-of-force incidents” (p.151). When these two mechanisms are used 
in combination, they can greatly improve the assessment of appropriate and inappropriate levels 
of force. According to Terrill et al. (2003), the Use-of-Force Continuum is simply a way to 
characterize and examine how officers apply force in relation to the resistance they encounter. 
The primary objective of using the force continuum as a measure of police force is to determine 
the extent to which officers follow or deviate from the continuum’s structure. The primary focus 
of the Use-of-Force Continuum is the notion of control. If the structure of the continuum is 
followed, the intended purpose of control has been achieved. If the continuum structure has not 
been followed, the use of force was deemed to be for some other unauthorized purpose (Terrill, 
2005). 
The Use-of-Force Continuum typically initiates with verbal commands and presence by 
the officer. As increasing levels of resistance to the officer’s commands and attempts to control a 
suspect are encountered, the level of force is increased incrementally. If resistance is 
encountered, the level of force is increased by the use of weapons such as batons, chemical 
sprays, or tasers, but it can also be techniques such as empty-handed strikes or leg kicks and, 
ultimately, it can culminate with officers using deadly force.   
Despite the infrequency of police use of force and the limited number of injuries incurred 
during that use of force, police brutality and excessive use of force remains at the forefront of 
public scrutiny and media attention. Using this as a framework, any understanding of the public’s 
perception of police use of force must be measured by these limited incidents.   
Research on use of force has found that a variety of variables influence police use of 
force. These include both situational variables, such as the presence of citizen bystanders,   
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suspect characteristics and demeanor, as well as individual level variables, such as officer 
characteristics. A short summary of these studies is provided. 
The Research on Variables that Influence Police Use of Force 
The Influence of Suspect Characteristics in Use-of-Force Encounters 
A great deal of research has focused on the influence of suspect characteristics on police 
use of force (Friedrich, 1980; Sherman, 1980; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In the area of deadly 
force research, the effect of race of suspects involved in police shootings has dominated the 
literature (Binder & Fridell, 1984; Fyfe, 1979; 1980; 1988; Geller & Scott, 1992). Research has 
found that black suspects are more likely to be stopped and interrogated by officers, but minority 
suspects are also more likely to be uncooperative with police (Black, 1971; Ferdinand & 
Luchterhand, 1970; Terrill et al., 2003). Suspect age and gender also has been examined as a 
situational variable in police use-of-force studies (Friedrich, 1980; Sherman, 1980). Research 
indicates that police typically perceive women to be less aggressive than men in use-of-force 
encounters (Croft, 1985; Klinger, 1995). There has been considerable controversy about and 
public scrutiny of the use of tasers on juveniles and women. Youthful offenders have been 
identified in the research as being perceived by police as more threatening to them than adult 
suspects (Faulkner, 1991; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Because gender and age are areas of 
concern, they will be included as situational variables for analysis. 
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The Number of Other Officers Present During Use-of-Force Encounters 
  The number of officers present at the scene of an incident has been shown to influence 
officer’s propensity to use force (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). The nature of the relationship of 
this variable to the use of force is mixed. Research has found that single officers tend to be more 
cautious and less prone to assert themselves in situations where force may be applied (Banton, 
1964; Wilson, 1963). In general, officers have been found to act differently and are unwilling to 
engage in high-risk behavior when no peer support is present (Friedrich, 1977). This finding is 
counter intuitive to the conventional wisdom that more officers, either in a patrol car (1 officer 
patrol car versus 2 officers assigned to a patrol car), or on the scene of as use of force encounter, 
provide a measure of safety for officers.   The effect of the number of officers present in use-of-
force encounters is an important situational variable and, as such, will be incorporated in this 
study design. 
The Presence of Citizen Bystanders during Police Use-of-Force Encounters 
  Early studies indicated that excessive force is less likely to occur in public places 
(Sherman, 1980; Smith, 1986). Other research has failed to link the visibility of the situation to 
changes in the frequency or severity of police use of force (Friedrich, 1980). The location where 
use of force occurs has also been a subject of prior research (Friedrich, 1980; Sherman, 1980; 
Smith, 1986). Additionally, studies have shown that the presence of bystanders was negatively 
related to the perceived necessity of drawing a weapon (Holzworth & Pipping, 1985).   
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The Types of Incidents That Lead to Use of Force 
 The threat or seriousness of the incident and type of incident has been found to be 
significant in the use of force by police officers (Bayley & Garofolo, 1989; Garner et al, 2002; 
Terrill, 2003). Other research has failed to conclusively relate the nature of the encounter to the 
levels of physical force used (Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1982). Research has found that it is difficult 
to link definitively the nature of the incident to the resulting use of force. Some incidents begin 
as routine encounters or calls for police service that escalate to a use of force by the officer. 
Other more serious offences, with suspect apprehensions, may not result in any use of force. 
Research has examined the effect of whether or not an encounter was officer initiated or a 
call for police service (Friedrich, 1980). Much of the criticism on the use of taser is focused on 
the types of encounters that lead to its use and the role of the officer in those encounters (GAO, 
2005). The change in placement of the taser in the Use-of-Force Continuum was designed to 
reduce the use of tasers in lower-level encounters, where suspects may only be exhibiting passive 
resistance. Often, these types of encounters result from self-initiated, consensual police-citizen 
encounters, such as traffic stops, or consensual encounters with suspects in high drug sales areas 
(McBride & Tedder, 2005).   
A variety of tools and weapons have been developed and implemented to aid police in 
protecting themselves and in maintaining public order. A short summary of the history of these 
tools is practical in any discussion of police use-of-force issues and, therefore, is presented 
below. 
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Traditional Police Tools Used to Keep the Peace 
 Historically, police have sought suitable tools to control the behavior of criminals. Impact 
weapons were one of the first weapons sued by police. The “billy club,” also known as a 
”truncheon” was issued to London's Bobbies in the late 1820s (Truncale, 1996). British police 
leaders sought a weapon that was not immediately intimidating to citizens. The truncheon was 
small enough to be concealed in the pocket of a coat or in trousers, but, when needed, it was 
effective for rendering an unruly suspect compliant (Truncale, 1996). 
Nightsticks, Flashlights, and Batons   
 Officers have been provided with a variety of impact weapons since the inception of 
organized policing (Peak, 1990). The first police nightsticks or batons used by American police 
were made of wood and were standard issue for most police departments well into the 1980s. 
The next generation of baton was developed in 1958 by William Bailey and was known as a 
monadnock™ or PR-24 baton. It had a side handle, which was mounted at a 90-degree angle. 
This weapon was very effective and was adopted for use by police agencies throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. It afforded officers a wider range of defensive techniques and an increased 
capability to defeat an adversary in a hand-to-hand confrontation (Truncale, 1996).    
 The problem of portability for officers who must carry an array of equipment created the 
need for the expandable baton (Ederheimer & Fridell, 2005). Expandable batons have only been 
used by police since the 1980’s; they consist of metal tubes that lock into place with a snap of the 
wrist. The disadvantage of expandable batons is that they may collapse with a hard strike to an 
immovable surface. Expandable batons lack the durability of a traditional fixed baton. The latest  
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styles of expandable batons are made from a combination of polycarbonate and metal and  
automatically lock in place to prevent collapse (NIJ, 1998). 
 Flashlights have also been a standard issue with police since their inception. The 
flashlight as a weapon of choice has at times been a topic of police research. Several incidents of 
unnecessary force or even death have been attributed to police use of the flashlight as an impact 
weapon. This use as a blunt force impact weapon remains controversial (Cox, Faughn & Nixon, 
1985). 
Firearms as a Law Enforcement Tool 
 Despite the fact that firearms were essential in the creation of the government of the 
United States after breaking away from British rule, the use of firearms by police was not 
immediately accepted by the citizenry of the newly formed United States (Villa & Morris, 1999). 
The fear of a standing army and centralized authority had not abated since the revolution, and, 
for many people, the police represented both. The uncertain role of police and the influence of 
local politics made armed police an unpopular choice for most cities (Wadman & Allison, 2004). 
Even though firearms were used regularly by criminals, and possessed by even ordinary citizens, 
uniformed officers and watchman were not authorized to carry firearms in most major U.S. cities 
until the middle part of the 19th century (Wadman & Allison, 2004). After the killings of several 
officers by gun wielding criminals, the police in most metropolitan cities were issued revolvers 
for self-protection (Bailey, 1995). New York City police officers were issued Colt .32 caliber 
revolvers in the 1890s, and other east coast cites, such as Philadelphia and Boston, quickly 
followed suit (Bailey, 1995). Some police departments, such as the Phoenix Police Department, 
did not arm their police until 1911 (NIJ, 1998). It was not until the 1920 and 1930s that the 
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arming of police gained widespread acceptance in America. The .32 caliber Colt revolver 
remained the weapon of choice for most agencies well into the 20th century (Wadman & Allison, 
2004).   
 As the frequency of police shootings increased during the 1960s and 1970s, many 
agencies upgraded their weapons to more powerful revolvers (Bailey, 1996; NIJ, 1998). It was 
not until the 1980s that police agencies began to transition from revolvers to semi-automatic 
pistols for officers. This transition was in response to a wave of violent crime in most large 
American cities during the 1980s, which left police feeling outgunned by their criminal 
counterparts (Geller & Scott, 1992).    
 Several highly publicized and controversial fatal police shootings during this time period 
sparked widespread civil unrest in several major U.S. cities (Kelling & Wycoff, 2001). These 
controversies motivated police agencies to seek alternatives to deadly force for their officers. 
These alternatives were manifested in the form of a wide range of tools and weapons designed to 
incapacitate offenders, without inflicting unnecessary harm or death. Prior to this time period, 
these weapons had been the exclusive purview of the military or the special weapons units within 
most major police departments. The mainstreaming of these weapons to conventional police 
forces was a significant change for most agencies. These options became known as less-than-
lethal weapons (LTL). 
Less-Than-Lethal Weapons for Police 
There is substantial peer-reviewed research on the subject of non-lethal alternatives for 
police (Geller & Scott, 1992; Homant & Kennedy, 2000; Lumb & Friday, 1997; McEwen & 
Leahy, 1993; McEwen, 1997; Meyer, 1992; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Parent, 2000; Peak, 
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1990). The term “non-lethal” weapon is often misunderstood or misinterpreted as being 
euphemistic or an oxymoron. Most non-lethal technologies have inflicted lethal results if 
improperly employed or under very unique circumstances (Lewer, 2003). For this reason, the 
term “less-than-lethal” has been more readily accepted. Any use of force that is not designed to 
kill could be defined as less-than-lethal. The traditional definition for less-than-lethal weapons 
are those designed to render a suspect compliant using force less than is designed to be lethal 
(Lamb, 1995). 
Lamb (1995) posits that “nonlethal weapons are discriminate weapons that are explicitly 
designed and employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities 
and undesired damage to property and environment. Unlike weapons that permanently destroy 
targets through blast, fragmentation, or penetration, nonlethal weapons have relatively reversible 
effects on targets and/or are able to discriminate between targets and non-targets in the weapon's 
area of impact” (p.1).      
The concept of non-lethal weapons is also attractive to politicians. Most police agencies 
responding to criticism about the use of deadly force have sought more humane methods for 
dealing with unruly mobs, arresting violent criminals, and controlling emotionally disturbed 
people (Lewer, 2003). 
Less-than-lethal weapons were first introduced to law enforcement in the early 1970s 
(Robin, 1996). The development of these weapons was motivated by historical events and 
initiatives at both the local and federal level. The 1967 Presidential Crime Commission report, 
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, identified the need for police to seek alternatives to 
deadly force. The 308-page report contained 200 recommendations for the development of 
policies and technologies to fight crime. As a result of this report and its recommendations, 
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millions of federal dollars flowed into crime fighting initiatives and technologies (Kelling & 
Wycoff, 2001).      
The landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Tennessee v. Garner (1985), which 
prohibited police from using deadly force to apprehend unarmed or nonviolent fleeing felony 
suspects, also fueled the development of alternatives to deadly force (Pilant, 1993). A subsequent 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) report also called for the development of alternatives for police 
in lieu of deadly force (NIJ, 1998). This spurred great interest in funding research for a wide 
range of less-than-lethal alternatives for law enforcement officers. The Rodney King incident in 
Los Angeles galvanized public opinion regarding excessive use of force by police and spurred 
the creation of an independent city commission on use-of-force issues. The commission also 
made recommendations that called for more alternatives for police to deal with nonviolent but 
noncompliant offenders (Meyer, 1992). Various authors have cited the need for continued 
expansion and exploration of less-than-lethal alternatives for police (Bailey, 1996; Garner et al., 
1996; Homant & Kennedy, 2000; Lumb & Friday, 1997; McEwen, 1993; McEwen, 1997; 
Meyer, 1992; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Parent, 2000; Peak, 1990).  
An analysis of policy development can provide insight into how policy on less-than- 
lethal (LTL) force has driven the development of LTL weapons and tactics. McEwen (1997) 
reviewed the use-of-force policies from 96 law enforcement agencies. The study concluded that 
LTL weapons policies influenced the levels of police shootings. The two significant findings of 
this study were an increasing reliance on OC spray by officers in many police departments and 
the identification of a significant number of agencies with inconsistent policies that define lethal 
and non-lethal force. The significance of this study to the current area of investigation is that 
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simply providing officers with this type of weaponry and training is insufficient (McEwen, 
1997).  
  The effect of LTL weapons on the killing of citizens by police was the subject of a 1996 
study. Bailey (1996) used national data for large U.S. cities for the year 1990 to examine the 
relationship between the availability of various types of LTL weapons and the rates of police-
citizen killings for the public, in general, and by race, in particular. This study found no evidence 
that the availability of LTL weapons reduced the number of police killings of citizens. The 
limitations of this report are its use of FBI data on justifiable homicide rates and the limitations 
of the data that indicate the availability of LTL weapons by the agencies chosen (Bailey, 1996).    
Modern Less-Than-Lethal Weaponry 
A wide range of LTL options and tactics have been developed that provide alternatives 
for officers to employ when dealing with unruly or combative violators. These options can be 
deployed against individual suspects who are resisting police actions, or in situations involving 
multiple suspects in a riot or civil disorder. A variety of LTL projectiles, such as rubber or 
wooden bullets and gas munitions, have been developed for use on physically combative or 
barricaded suspects, or for use in disturbances with multiple suspects. Typically, these options 
allow the officer to deploy weapons against potentially armed or violent suspects at a safe 
distance. Other options, such as impact weapons, chemical sprays, or electronic control devices, 
are designed for use by a lone officer against single or multiple combative offenders in close 
proximity. Each of these use-of-force options have strengths and limitations. A short summary of 
the history of these weapons and a summary of the evaluative research of their use are presented 
for illustration. 
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Chemical Sprays 
One LTL alternative that gained popularity with police is the use of chemical sprays. A 
variety of chemical sprays have been developed and used by both the military and the police 
since the mid-1960s. These include CN, CS, and OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) spray. CN gas 
(Chloroacetaphenone), or tear gas, was introduced for police use in the 1960s. Its principle use 
was in civil disorders or riots. It is an irritant that produces burning in the eyes, nose, and throat. 
CS gas (Ortho/Chlorobenzal-Malononitrile), another disabling gas, also came into use during the 
1960s and 1970s. CS gas causes pain in the nose, throat, and chest. It also can cause nausea and 
vomiting, and it is considered more potent than CN gas (Alpert and Smith, 2000).      
 The latest chemical spray to be developed and used by police is (OC) spray. The original 
versions of this spray developed in the 1980s were known as “mace” and were initially used by 
the U.S Postal Service Carriers (Geller & Scott, 1992, p. 378). OC spray is derived from an 
irritant in cayenne pepper and is one of the more popular and effective products on the market 
today (Alpert & Smith, 2000; Meyer, 1992). The police have used it extensively since its 
inception as a LTL weapon.        
McEwen and Leahy (1993) estimate that 41% of the major public safety agencies in the 
United States equip their personnel with OC spray. In a survey of 378 police and Sheriff’s 
departments, McEwen and Leahy (1993) found that 65 percent of responding agencies issue 
chemical sprays to their officers. Alpert and Smith (2000) also found that OC spray is widely 
used by agencies with more than 100 officers. A number of studies have been conducted on the 
use of OC spray by police. These studies have used a variety of methods to explain and evaluate 
the use of OC spray. 
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Case Studies of OC Spray Implementation 
In one of the more comprehensive studies on the use of chemical spray, Morabito and 
Doerner (1997) examined police use of OC spray in the Tallahassee, Florida Police Department 
(TPD). The study used 563 use-of-force forms completed by the officers between 1993 and 
1995. The results of the study revealed that the use of OC spray results in fewer and less severe 
officer and offender injuries relative to impact weapons (batons and flashlights). OC spray was 
effective only three-quarters of the time it was deployed; however it did neutralize a wide 
spectrum of suspects. The level of effectiveness of OC spray in the study sample fell far below 
the manufacturer’s claims for the type of spray used by the TPD. Morabito and Doerner (1997) 
identified many of the strengths and weaknesses of the use of OC spray as a LTL weapon. The 
fact that OC allows the officer to remain at a distance and still exercise some control over a 
noncompliant suspect and the fact that injuries to officers and suspects are greatly reduced by 
OC use is significant. The study also identified the tendency of officers to move into close 
proximity with suspects who are believed to be armed or who appear to be more dangerous to 
them. This would tend to be a detractor for the use of OC spray. It would seem to indicate a lack 
of confidence in the spray by officers or an unwillingness to rely on it in these types of 
confrontations. The lack of effectiveness of the OC product studied might also be relevant to this 
line of reasoning. If the officers lacked confidence in the product, they might be less inclined to 
use it in more serious or hazardous situations. 
Kaminski, Edwards, and Johnson (1999) studied the use of OC spray by the Baltimore 
County, Maryland, Police Department. The study examined 878 uses of uses of OC spray from 
July 1993 to December 1996. Their findings indicated officers reported an 85 percent 
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effectiveness rate in making arrests. However, a much lower rate of effectiveness was noted with 
mentally disturbed or intoxicated suspects. 
The implementation of OC spray by a single agency was the subject of a study by Atkins 
(2003). This study examined the use of OC spray by a medium-sized municipal police agency 
between 1999 and 2001. Using primarily self-reported data, OC deployments were examined to 
determine their effectiveness as a LTL technology for police. The results of the study revealed 
that while the frequency of injuries to officers during the examination period decreased, the 
number of excessive use-of-force complaints increased. The limitations of this study lie in its use 
of officers' self-reported data and the inability of findings to be generalized to a larger population 
(Adkins, 2003). This study, like many others, fails to resolve or address the central question: 
Would officers have resorted to this level of force if they did not have OC spray available to 
them? More succinctly, what effect(s) do the availability of LTL alternatives have on the levels 
of force used and the number of excessive use-of-force complaints filed by citizens? 
A study by Bowling and Gaines (2000) examined officer and suspect injuries and 
excessive force complaints during the deployment of OC spray by officers in three North 
Carolina law enforcement agencies during a two-year period from 1997 through 1998. The 
agencies studied were the Winston Salem Police Department, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 
Department, and the North Carolina State Highway Patrol. The study used self-reported use-of-
force data by officers and queried suspect injury and excessive force complaint data information 
from agency records. The study found the use of OC spray was associated with declines in the 
number of injuries to NC Highway Patrol officers and complaints of excessive use of force. It 
also found a strong association with OC use and reduction of injuries to suspects and overall 
officer use of force in one of the agencies. The results of this study highlight the difficulty with 
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generalizing any finding to the community of law enforcement. The data captured in the use-of-
force forms examined did not relate the same information in a consistent way from all of the 
agencies. The lack of consistent use-of-force and injury data from all of the study sites 
contributed to the inability to link OC spray use to changes in the identified study categories 
(Bowling & Gaines, 2000). 
Another LTL tool that has gained popularity with law enforcement is the conducted 
energy device, or electronic control weapon, or taser. Conducted energy devices, or electronic 
control weapons, encompass a wide range of products and weapons that use electricity to 
incapacitate a suspect. Electronic control weapons include the taser and stun guns. 
Tasers 
     Taser technology has been in service with law enforcement agencies since 1974 
(IACP, 2004). A number of articles are available from publications on specific taser products 
(Nielson, 2001; Vogel, 1998; Williams, 2001). These articles primarily discuss product features 
or innovations to specific models, or they track the progression in product development. These 
publications do not specifically discuss or evaluate the effectiveness or characteristics of 
operational taser deployments. A review of current literature reveals limited research on police 
use of taser in conjunction with situational variables, such as suspect characteristics, the types of 
incidents which lead to taser use, or the number of officers or bystanders present. There are a 
limited number of research studies that examine taser use in conjunction with other LTL use-of-
force methods. Several studies examine taser use by single agencies. A brief summary of these 
studies is presented. 
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Case Studies of the Use of Tasers 
In one of the more comprehensive studies of use of force by a police agency, Meyer 
(1992) evaluated statistics of taser, (OC) chemical spray, and a variety of other use-of-force 
methods. The study examined 568 use-of-force reports from the Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD) during 1989. These incidents involved a variety of non-lethal tactics deployed on 
suspects. These tactics included the use of batons, flashlights, karate kicks, punches, swarming 
(several officers rushing the suspect), chemical sprays, and taser deployments. The injuries 
sustained by suspects and officers from each type of force were compared. The suspects' injuries 
were classified into three groups based on severity, using major, moderate, and minor categories. 
The overall findings of this study were remarkable with respect to injuries inflicted by impact 
weapons when compared to other types of use-of-force methods (Illustrated in Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Officer and Suspect Injury Rates by Type of Force Used LAPD 
Force type Study 
cases 
Injury to 
officers 
Injury to 
suspects 
Baton  143 23 (16%)  86 (60%) 
Kick 47  5 (11%) 12 (26%) 
Punch 36 13 (36%) 28 (64%) 
Miscellaneous 
bodily force 
143 21 (15%) 66 (46%) 
Flashlight 25 1 (4%) 20 (80%) 
Swarm 51 8 (16%) 12 (24%) 
Chemical spray 21  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Taser 102  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 568 72(13%) 221 (39%) 
(This table was created by collapsing data from tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 from Meyer, 1992) 
 
 
The significance of this research study is that the rates of injury to suspects and officers 
were shown to be significantly reduced when tasers or chemical sprays were used. The use of 
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other force methods resulted in increased levels of both officer and suspect injuries. This study 
was one of the first practical studies to examine taser use in an operational context when 
compared to other LTL use-of-force methods. The limitations of this study could be argued as 
the relative low number (102 cases) of taser and chemical spray deployments. 
The Effectiveness of Tasers 
Meyer (1992), in his study of LAPD use-of-force reports, discussed effectiveness rates 
for the individual weapons and techniques used. Meyer defined effectiveness as “if the 
application of force ended the altercation” (Meyer, 1992, p. 16). According to Meyer (1992), 
“there is overwhelming data to support the conclusions that non-lethal weapons are as effective 
as other force types, and that the use of selected non-lethal weapons results in virtually no 
serious injuries to officers or suspects” (p.16). The significance of this research is that it 
compares a variety of non-lethal use-of-force methods by a common set of standards, i.e., rate 
and severity of injuries and effectiveness.   
The most-used types of force were the baton, the miscellaneous bodily force (pushing, 
shoving, grabbing), and the taser. The least-used force types were the chemical spray, flashlight, 
and punches. Meyer determined that the effectiveness rate of the baton was 85%, the “karate 
kick” effectiveness rate was 87%, the punch rate was 75%, and the miscellaneous force rate was 
94%. The flashlight rate was 96% and the swarm, or organized tackle, rate was 92%. The 
chemical spray rate was 90% and the taser rate was 86%.  
A similar study conducted in Henrico County, Virginia, examined a wide range of use-of-
force methods for effectiveness. Using a self-reporting survey instrument, Smith and Petrocelli 
(2002) captured responses on the effectiveness of multiple use-of-force tactics employed by 
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officers making arrests during 1999. The focus of this research was on the officers’ use of a 
sequence of tactics to gain control of suspects. The significance of this research lies in validating 
the importance of officers progressing through multiple tactics to achieve higher levels of 
effectiveness. 
A 2002 study by the Seattle Police Department (SPD) examined data on taser use by SPD 
during a 13-month period. The purposes of the study were to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
M26 taser as a LTL option for SPD officers and to identify any future training or deployment 
needs. The report concludes that the M26 Taser was effective in disabling offenders 92% of the 
time it was used, provided that verified taser contact was obtained. This occurred in only 85% of 
taser uses. The report documents that “Both officers and suspects reported low rates of injury 
during taser incidents when compared with other use-of-force situations” (SPD, 2002, p.3).   
 A study by Hougland, Mesloh, and Henych, (2005) examined taser use at the Orange 
County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office. The effect on civil litigation by taser deployments was one 
area of their examination. Their study also examined the frequency of taser use and at what level 
in the use-of-force matrix, or continuum, the taser was deployed. Their data indicates that, since 
being implemented, the taser became the primary LTL weapon deployed by officers. Despite the 
fact that agency policy allows for use at the passive resistance level of the Use-of-Force 
Continuum, the taser was deployed more often (69%) in situations when officers encountered 
active physical resistance (Hougland et al. 2005). 
Despite the fact that some commonalities exist in cases where deaths occur from taser 
use, it appears that more research is needed. Additional research is needed to clarify the 
standards to be used to measure the effects of the taser that may cause unintentional death or 
injury. A larger sampling of these types of cases should be reviewed to capture more of the 
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variables affecting the analyses of the taser as a LTL weapon and to better assess the risks 
associated with its use. 
Suspect Injuries and Unanticipated Consequences of Taser Use 
There is a body of research that examines the effectiveness of tasers in rendering suspects 
compliant; however, there is limited medical research available on its effects on human subjects. 
A 1991 study conducted by the Chief Medical Examiner in Los Angeles County which examined 
sixteen deaths associated with taser use in Los Angeles County between 1983 and 1987 was 
reviewed (Kornblum, 1991). The study presented a general profile of the victims, their age, sex, 
and race. Also documented were specific behaviors exhibited when the police encountered them 
and the manner of death (accident or homicide). The study specifically looked at whether or not 
the suspect was found to be under the influence of illegal drugs, the time interval between the 
taser deployment and death, and the number of taser cassettes fired. According to Kornblum 
(1991), drugs, specifically cocaine, PCP, or amphetamines, were found in 13 of 16 cases. All of 
these subjects sustained some form of injuries varying from a few superficial abrasions to 
gunshot wounds. “…aside from the injuries sustained in the confrontation with police and the 
use of the taser, these deaths vary only slightly from those caused by solely cocaine or PCP” 
(p.445). This conclusion supports the position that the taser alone is not to blame for these 
injuries. 
A review of the injuries related to the use of tasers by the Portland, Oregon, Police 
Department between June 2002 and July 2003 was conducted by McManus, Forsyth, Hawks, and 
Jui, (2004). This study revealed that 42 percent of 227 taser deployments generated EMS reports. 
During the study period there were no documented dysrhythmias or cardiac complaints and sixty 
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of the patients (63%) had no documented injury.  Minor secondary injuries (hematomas, 
lacerations, and contusions) were documented in 27 (28%) of the patients. Nine (9 %) of the 
patients sustained self-inflicted or unrelated injuries. McManus et al. (2004) concluded that “the 
M26 taser appears to be a safe and effective non-lethal weapon” (p.587). Despite the fact that no 
deaths were reported during their examination the authors note a higher incidence of injuries than 
manufacturer reports claim.   
Ordog, Wasserberger, Schalater, and Balasubramanium (1987) examined 218 patients 
who were treated in an emergency room after being shot by police with a taser for violent or 
criminal behavior in Los Angeles County between July 1980 and December 1985. Their report 
found that complications associated with taser wounds included contusions, abrasions, and 
lacerations in 38 percent of the cases examined. Another 1 percent suffered mild 
rhabdomyolysis, or muscle breakdown, and a smaller (0.5) percent of suspects suffered testicular 
torsion. According to the report, “Although 48% of ‘tasered’ patients required hospitalization, all 
but one was for a preexisting injury or toxic or psychiatric problem” (p.78). The authors 
concluded that tasers are relatively safe when compared to more conventional weapons (Ordog et 
al., 1987).  
A medical literature review conducted by Bleetman and Steyn (2003) concluded that the 
medical risks of electronic weaponry compare favorably with those of more conventional 
methods of controlling noncompliant and violent subjects. The risk factors for death in ‘tasered’ 
subjects appear to be no different from known risk factors for death in custody and include the 
subjects' use of drugs and symptoms, such as exhaustion or bizarre behavior, that lead to the 
arrest.  
 49
   
Despite the limited numbers of deployments of tasers by its police forces in the United 
Kingdom, some preliminary research into the use of tasers has taken place. A report by the 
United Kingdom’s Defense Scientific Advisory Council’s subcommittee concluded that the risk 
of life threatening or serious injuries from the M26 Advanced Taser appears to be very low 
(DOMILL, 2004). It should be noted that most police use of tasers in the UK are by special units 
within the Metropolitan Police Force, who are also equipped with firearms. This greatly 
influences the types of situations where tasers are deployed in an operational context (Lewer & 
Davison, 2006). 
In the Taser Task Force (2005) study conducted by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office in 
Orlando, Florida, a medical expert panel reviewed the medical literature offered by Taser 
International, Inc., and numerous other independent studies during their investigation of taser 
deployments by the Sheriff’s Office over a 5-year period. “The panel concluded the level of 
electrical output or shock delivered by a taser is unlikely to cause serious or permanent injury”. 
(OCSO Task Force, 2005, p.35). 
In an attempt to mitigate injuries to suspects and to govern the use of tasers as a LTL 
weapon, police agencies have developed organizational policies that provide guidance on the 
prudent use of tasers. The placement of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum gives officers 
instruction on what level of suspect resistance must be present to authorize the deployment of the 
taser. The development and implementation of these policies regarding taser use represents a 
significant challenge for police administrators. The policies that govern taser use have also 
generated considerable public criticism and media scrutiny. As with any organizational policy 
that deals with high-liability areas of police activity, the issues that drive the policy change are 
often politically charged and force police leaders to confront difficult issues and make value 
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judgments. A significant body of research deals specifically with the process and effect of policy 
change. A significant part of this study will examine the effect of policy change related to the use 
of taser and how it has affected taser use. 
The Research on Organizational Policy Change 
 Organizational change in police agencies has been the subject of a large body of work by 
various researchers. The majority of this work relates to macrostructural changes in 
organizations and how they affect work performance, policy development, agency members’ 
perceptions, and effectiveness (Guyot, 1979; King, 2003; Thacher & Rein, 2004).   
Other researchers have focused on the paramilitary structure of police agencies and how 
it affects police organizational change (Auten; 1985; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Rasor, 1999). 
Much of this research seeks to remedy the cultural resistance to change for police organizations. 
According to Lingamneni (1979), “Police organizations and the individuals which make up those 
organizations have tended to resist substantive changes recommended from both within and 
outside their ranks” (p.25). Thus, police often are very resistant to changes to either 
organizational structure or police procedures. This tendency leads to the development of policy 
in a variety of unorthodox and complex ways.   
While police have always been enamored with tools and weapons, one of the areas where 
police have been resistant to change historically is the advent of new procedures, tactics, and 
policies that guide their use. Mosher (1967), in his work on government reorganizations, 
identified new technology, new equipment, and advancing knowledge as identifiable factors that 
make change necessary. Regardless of the impetus for change using new procedures and tactics, 
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various researchers have attempted to understand why, when, and how policy does (or does not) 
change. 
The dilemma faced by police officers when use of force is indicted is that, despite the 
placement of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum, the officers, because of their core value, 
conflict with trying to balance safety for all and, therefore, tend to use it when they see fit, even 
if this conflicts with agency policy. The testing of the officer’s ability to balance these values 
with when to use this type of nonlethal force is the focus of this research study. 
Theoretical Framework for Organizational Policy Change 
Thacher and Rein (2004) provide a theoretical framework for the study of the effects of 
policy change on taser use and effectiveness. Their theory of value conflict and policy change 
explicates government’s tendency to balance competing goals or striking trade offs among 
values. They define values-oriented casuistry, or rationalization, as a form of moral taxonomy 
that aids in values balancing. Stewert (2006) interprets this theory further by explaining how 
“police departments, required to give their officers guidance on how to handle criminals 
effectively without undue harm, often come up with case-by-case approaches on how to respond 
to particular situations” (p. 184). 
Taser use and the policies that guide its use must always attempt to balance competing 
values involving the safety of the public and suspects, as well as the safety of the police officer. 
The Use-of-Force Continuum provides an example of this values management casuistry. 
Therefore, the Use-of-Force Continuum and the policies that guide its use represent the police 
agencies’ attempts to manage the conflict, thereby maintaining safety for all. 
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According to Thacher and Rein (2004) “policy actors eschew general decisions about 
how conflicting values should be weighed; instead, they encourage and facilitate case-by-case 
judgment about how decisions should be made, typically using analytical reasoning to do so” 
(p.464). 
Many forms of decision-making in government can be seen as casuistic responses to 
problems of value choice, such as retirement policy, crime policy, and refugee policy. Policy on 
the use of force by police also clearly qualifies as one of these areas. The use of LTL weapons 
and the policies that guide their use attempt to “balance” the competing values of the public 
safety, including suspects or bystanders, and the safety of the police officer. 
The Use-of-Force Continuum is a practical example of this values management casuistry. 
Bittner (1970) states that Use-of-Force Continuum guidelines are built upon the assertion that 
police coercion is, and must be, situationally justified. According to Terrill (2005), “Situations 
confronting officers may vary infinitely, but workable standards to be used on the street cannot 
mirror that level of complexity and are limited by the … number of principles and categories” 
(p.110). 
The continuum is a taxonomy of appropriate levels of force to be used by officers 
confronted by suspect resistance or violence. These policies represent the balancing of values 
conflict. When making policy decisions, governments must weigh the risks versus the rewards of 
determining appropriate levels of authorized police force. The Use-of-Force Continuum and the 
policies that guide its use represent police policy makers’ attempts to manage the conflict 
between these two competing values. 
It is understood that police use of force is central to the police mission (Bittner, 1970, 
1990). The appropriate proportional and incremental nature of that force is not as clear 
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(Klockars, 1996). The Use-of-Force Continuum is an incremental guide for police officers to 
employ when confronting noncompliant or resistive suspects. The movement of levels of force 
up or down the continuum is a subjective decision based on many situational factors. Most of 
these factors are external to the bureaucratic police-working environment. These can include the 
suspect’s demeanor, the degree of danger to the officer, or the presence of a weapon. The 
internal working environment is often referred to as the degree of license given to police officers 
to use force (White, 2001). Police policy makers must apply a reasonableness standard as 
interpreted by state and federal laws when creating or amending agency policies. Often, it is this 
application of reasonableness that leads to a values balancing by policy makers. This balancing 
typically comes in the form of implementing new policy or amending existing policies.    
Thacher and Rein (2004) cite noted police scholar Carl Klockars, who discusses in great 
detail the dilemma faced by police decision makers who must manage the use of force by police 
applying the nebulous definitions of excessive or appropriate levels of force provided by 
constitutional lawmakers (Klockars, 1996). It is these laws that predominantly must guide policy 
development on police use of force. The question ultimately becomes “How can society 
authorize the use of necessary force but eliminate the use of excessive force?” (Thacher & Rein, 
2004, p. 477). 
Much of the controversy surrounding taser use relates to the frequency of its use and the 
specific situations when police officers should use it which is governed by the Use-of-Force 
Continuum. The influence of external political forces on policymaking is a central concern for 
policy change theorists. What is not clear is the role public scrutiny of police actions plays in 
motivating and influencing the policy change or the effect on officers’ actions and perceptions. 
This study will explore these questions by examining an organizational policy change related to 
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police use of force. This change raised the level of suspect resistance required to justify the use 
of the taser. By examining archival data and officer survey responses, this study will evaluate the 
effect of policy change on taser deployments. 
This policy change was made obstensively to limit the use of tasers on suspects who were 
only passively resisting the actions of officers. Passive resistance is defined as refusing to 
comply with the commands of officers but not offering physical resistance.the policy change was 
also an  attempt to mitigate injuries to suspects in lower intensity encounters. It was also made at 
a time of significant public and media scrutiny of taser use and the injuries inflicted during 
deployments. The intent of the policy makers was to balance the need to protect citizens’ and 
officers’ safety while still maintaining order. This is a practical example of “striking trade offs” 
or the values balancing that Thacher and Rein (2004) discuss in their theory on organizational 
policy change.   
Weighing the need to protect life but also preserve order is a cornerstone of the police 
mission. This study uses  Thacher and Rein’s (2004) theory as a framework for understanding if 
the policy change relating to taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum achieved the 
theoretical balancing described in their values-oriented casuistry of the need to protect officers 
but not unnecessarily risk injuries to suspects. Clearly more explicite testing is necessary to 
quantitatively prove or disprove this theoritical framework.   
Literature Review, Summary, and Conclusions 
The data that is available on the use of tasers by police suggests that taser use is 
beneficial at controlling noncompliant suspects, without inflicting serious injury, and rarely has 
its use resulted in death. A review of current literature supports the effectiveness of taser use 
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although there are no current studies that examine the effect that use-of-force organizational 
policy changes can have on taser use. Much of the public controversy surrounding tasers focuses 
on when and how often officers should deploy them (PERF, 2005).      
In an attempt to mitigate public concerns and guide officers on the proper use of tasers, 
many agencies have changed their policies on placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum based on the level of suspect resistance encountered.  This has been done by raising 
the level of suspect resistance required to authorize the use of tasers in a use of force encounter.  
The effect of these policy changes on overall taser use has never been quantitatively evaluated or 
measured. This research is designed to provide quantifiable evidence to explicate these 
questions. Further research in this area can help to instill public confidence in law enforcement’s 
ability to maintain order without inflicting unnecessary injuries to suspects.   
Various studies have been conducted on the use of tasers by police and their effectiveness 
as a LTL use-of-force method. To date, there are no studies that focus on organizational policy 
and how a change in taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum influences taser use and 
effectiveness. This study will examine one police agency’s taser use after a change in policy 
designed to mitigate its use. The information gathered from this study will help to bridge the gap 
between previous studies that have focused primarily on specific factors, such as civil litigation, 
harm to suspects, and officer injuries. This study will examine the use of tasers during police-
citizen encounters using use-of-force incident data to see how a change in organizational policy 
has affected its deployment and how this core value conflict plays into this nexus. This study will 
also use a survey instrument to gather responses from taser users related to their perceptions and 
experiences with taser use. 
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 A thorough review of the literature reveals that anecdotal data exists that suggests that 
taser usage is beneficial in preventing serious injury to suspects or officers and rarely has its use 
resulted in death (Fish & Geddes, 2001; Hamilton, 1991; Kornblum, 1991; Meyer, 1992; 
Nielson, 2001). What is needed in the literature are more studies that examine how 
organizational policy changes related to its placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum can alter 
the effectiveness of taser use.   
Taser manufacturers have begun to market these weapons aggressively in the lay 
community. One company, Taser International, has begun selling tasers to women by 
showcasing them at home taser parties in much the same way as Tupperware products are 
marketed and sold (The Associated Press, 2008). This trend, coupled with the increasing 
influence of these weapons on the police mission, all but ensures that the current level of public 
scrutiny of their use will continue. The media attention that recent injuries and deaths have 
drawn has also fueled the controversy. Research into the effectiveness of taser use and 
organizational policy changes could resolve many of the questions surrounding its use by police. 
Additional research will give police administrators and the public information needed to make 
informed decisions on the prudent use of public funds for these weapons. Further research will 
provide guidance to police on policy development related to the taser. This research could also 
help to instill greater public confidence in law enforcement’s ability to maintain order without 
inflicting unintended harm to suspects or officers.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of organizational policy changes 
regarding the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum on taser deployments. 
Officers’ perceptions of taser effectiveness after the policy change were also examined. The 
question explored in this study is whether there is a relationship between officer attitudes related 
to taser use and their subsequent perception of taser effectiveness. 
This study examines one agency’s experiences with tasers during two separate time 
periods, using archival use of force and officer survey data. This examination is crucial as much 
of the debate and controversy regarding the use of tasers by police focuses on the circumstances 
surrounding when police use tasers and what level of suspect resistance it is designed to defeat 
(Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006).      
After the introduction of newer and more powerful tasers in the early 1980s, many police 
agencies integrated their deployment into the Use-of-Force Continuum at a level to be used when 
suspects were only passively resisting the actions of the officer. The use of tasers in these low- 
intensity situations led to considerable media attention and public controversy (PERF, 2005). A 
review of current literature reveals no empirical research on the placement of tasers into the Use-
of-Force Continuum. In response to this scrutiny and to mitigate citizen complaints, many police 
agencies increased the required level of resistance by suspects from passive resistance to active 
physical resistance before tasers were authorized to be deployed. To date, no research studies 
have been conducted that examine this change in use-of-force policy to determine the effect it 
has had on taser deployments. 
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 For purposes of comparison, taser use-of-force data from two separate time periods was 
examined. Use of force data from the period before the change in policy to a higher level of force 
comprises the first data set for analysis. The second set of archival data examines data after the 
change in policy to determine what effect, if any, the change had on several identified areas. 
Survey data from actual taser users was collected to capture officer perceptions of organizational 
change. This survey data was examined and compared to use-of-force forms to determine if 
officer’s perceptions and the gathered archival data reflect similar patterns and findings. The 
literature generates the research questions and hypotheses listed below. 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for taser deployment had on the frequency of taser deployments?  
Research Question 2: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for taser deployment had on the level of suspect resistance encountered by officers?  
Research Question 3:   What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for taser deployment had on the frequency of injuries to suspects from taser 
deployments? 
Research Question 4:  What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for taser deployment had on the severity of injuries to suspects from taser 
deployments? 
Research Question 5: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for taser deployment had on the frequency of injuries to officers during taser 
deployments? 
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Research Question 6:  Do officers report that the change in organizational policy on the 
authorized level regarding the Use-of-Force Continuum, which outlines when the taser can be 
deployed, has increased the risk of harm to them in a use-of-force encounter? 
Research Question 7: Do officers perceive that the change in organizational policy 
relating to the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum, when the taser can be used, has 
increased the risk of harm to suspects in a use-of-force encounter? 
Research Question 8:  Do officers perceive that raising the authorized level on the Use-
of-Force Continuum for taser deployment places the taser at an appropriate level of force for 
most encounters? 
Data  
This study uses two sources of data: (1) agency use-of-force archival data and (2) survey 
data from taser-equipped officers. The archival data were gathered from the Orlando Police 
Department (OPD) during two separate 12-month periods. The purpose of this examination is to 
analyze the effect on the frequency of taser deployments, injuries to suspects, injuries to officers 
and levels of suspect resistance after changes in organizational policy that altered the placement 
of tasers on the Use-of-Force Continuum.  
The OPD in Orlando, Florida, was selected as the site for this research because of its size, 
the length of time tasers have been in use, and the fact that the agency changed its policy 
regarding placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum.  
The OPD staffing as of 2005 is approximately 706 sworn police officers, or 3.2 officers 
per 1,000 residents. The Police Chief is appointed by the Mayor, who is an elected official. The 
City of Orlando occupies approximately 110 square miles and is located in Central Florida. The  
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population in 2005 was 217,567 residents with a daily service population of approximately 
320,000. The City of Orlando has experienced significant growth from 1996 to 2005 with the 
population increasing 17%, or by 44,445 new residents during that period. Orlando is also one of 
the most popular tourist destinations in the world, with 36 million people a year visiting the 
area’s theme parks and attractions. 
 In 2005, the violent crime rate in Orlando was 17.47 incidents per 1,000 residents. The 
rate of property crime per 1,000 residents was 83.77 (FDLE, 2005). Data on the population, the 
changes in population between 1996 and 2005, the reported crime rate, and the fluctuation of 
crime rates over time for the City of Orlando was examined.  
Several other major cities in Florida were also examined and comparisons were made in a 
variety of categories to determine how Orlando compares with other similar sized metropolitan 
cities.  This data supports that in a majority of these categories, which measure growth, crime 
rates and police service delivery measures, the City of Orlando compares favorably with that of 
other major cites in Florida (See Table 4).  
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Table 4: Florida Police Department Comparison 
Police Department Orlando Miami Tampa St.  
Petersburg 
Ft. 
Lauderdale 
Hollywood 
Square Miles Served (2006) 110 35.7 112.1 59.6 31.7 27.3 
1996: 1996: 1996: 1996: 1996: 1996: 1996: 
Population Served 173,122 365,127 289,337 241,276 150,150 125,689 
Crime Rate per 100,000 13,895 14,493 14,817 10,016 16,972 9,973 
Total Crime Index 24,055 52,918 42,871 24,165 25,484 12,535 
Homicides 13 124 41 24 31 10 
Robberies 1,080 5,139 2,671 1,371 1,186 502 
Violent Crime per 1,000 23.17 32.84 30.02 22.65 17.19 9.21 
Property Crime per 1,000 115.83 112.09 118.15 77.50 152.53 90.52 
       
2000: 2000: 2000: 2000: 2000: 2000: 2000: 
Population Served 185,951 362,470 303,447 248,232 152,397 139,357 
Crime Rate per 100,000 12,030 10,968 11,095 8,220 8,387 6,900 
Total Crime Index 22,369 39,756 33,666 20,404 12,782 9,616 
Homicides 21 66 38 14 13 3 
Robberies 1,044 3,077 2,183 990 760 424 
Violent Crime per 1,000 21.11 21.73 21.03 16.23 11.56 7.76 
Property Crime per 1,000 99.18 87.95 89.92 65.97 72.31 61.25 
       
2005: 2005: 2005: 2005: 2005: 2005: 2005: 
Population Served 217,567 386,882 326,519 253,902 171,344 143,025 
Crime Rate per 100,000 10,124 7,613 7,650 7,980 7,423 5,084 
Total Crime Index 22,027 29,455 24,978 20,260 12,719 7,271 
Homicides 22 54 20 30 15 6 
Robberies 1,204 2,019 1,160 959 741 330 
Violent Crime per 1,000 17.47 15.84 14.42 15.51 8.77 5.40 
Property Crime per 1,000 83.77 58.88 62.08 64.29 65.46 45.43 
Sworn Officers 706 1,103 984 552 454 326 
Sworn per 1,000 3.2 2.64 3.02 2.18 2.65 2.28 
Sources: FDLE Total Index Crime for Florida, Jurisdiction and Offense, 1996, 2000, 2005  
Violent crime – homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault  
Property crime – burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft) 
 Sworn officer data FDLE 2005, Criminal Justice Agency Profile 
 
 
In January 2001, OPD adopted the taser as a less-than-lethal alternative. To date, 
approximately 700 tasers have been issued to police officers. The OPD also equips their officers 
with OC Chemical Spray and ASP expandable batons as less-than-lethal use-of-force 
alternatives. 
 The OPD requires the completion of a defensive tactics form by the first-line supervisor 
after each taser deployment (See Appendix B). The content of the form is reviewed by multiple 
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managers, and copies are sent to the Internal Affairs and Training sections. The use-of-force 
report form requires the supervisor to document the level of resistance offered by the suspect and 
the level of force used to compel the suspect into compliance. Additional demographic 
information on these forms includes the officer’s name, age, and tenure with the agency. 
Demographic information about the suspect is also captured, including name, race, sex, date of 
birth, home address, and physical condition prior to the incident. Several situational variables are 
also required on the form. These include whether the suspect was intoxicated; if the suspect had 
prior or new injuries; if medical treatment was required; the incident type; the date, time, and 
physical location of the incident; the number of involved officers; and the presence of citizen 
bystanders. 
Survey data was also used to examine the perceptions of officers related to the effect of 
the change in organizational policy on taser deployments. The officers surveyed were selected 
from a sample of taser-equipped officers. The officers were identified through the examination of 
the archival data, and they must have used a taser during both of the time periods examined in 
this study. 
Procedures 
Archival Data 
Archival taser use data for the June 4, 2003 through June 3, 2004 (Pretest) and June 5, 
2004 through June 5, 2005 (Posttest) time periods were compared. These data collection dates 
reflect the timetable for implementing the change in agency policy that requires officers to use 
the taser only when the encounter involves active physical resistance, on their Use-of-Force 
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Continuum. This organizational policy change took place on June 4, 2004 for the OPD (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline for Archival Data Analysis 
 
 
These data collection time periods capture use-of-force incidents that occurred one year 
before and one year after the organizational policy change regarding taser placement in the Use-
of-Force Continuum. OPD officers are guided on the use of tasers, also listed as electronic 
control devices (ECD)1, by agency policy 1128.6, which governs the use of force by Orlando 
Police Officers. The policy contains a resistance and response continuum that consists of six 
levels of resistance: indicators of resistance, verbal resistance, passive resistance, active 
resistance, aggressive resistance, and deadly force resistance (see Appendix A). The continuum 
also lists employee’s response levels, which coincide with suspect resistance. These include 
employee presence, verbal directions, soft control, hard control, intensified techniques, and 
deadly force. Within each response level on the form are required fields that denote specifically 
which weapon or technique the officer deployed. 
                                                 
1  The Orlando Police department uses the term (ECD) electronic control devices to describe tasers. This term is 
used interchangeably throughout this document. 
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 The OPD requires the officer’s supervisor to complete the use-of-force form if the 
suspect required medical treatment or was admitted to or treated and released from the hospital. 
A narrative portion requires the supervisor to describe the resistance offered and the suspect’s 
specific actions. There is also a portion requiring supervisory comments on the use of force, and 
the form must be signed by each level of the officer's chain of command. The form must also be 
attached to a copy of the agency incident report, which is completed for each incident.  
Survey Instrument 
A survey instrument for capturing officer perceptions of the effect of the policy changes 
on taser deployments was developed (See Appendix C). Prior to administering the survey 
instrument to the selected sample of officers, a pretest sample of three officers from OPD and 
two deputies from the Orange County Sheriff’s Office were asked to take the survey and 
comment on its clarity and ease of completion. Feedback was obtained from each of these 
participants and changes were made to the survey instrument. The majority of their comments 
pertained to the length of the instrument and recommended changes in wording to some of the 
questions. This process was done to guarantee that the content validity of the survey was 
maintained (Babbie, 2001). 
The revised instrument was then administered to a sample of 333 OPD officers. The 
officers chosen to participate in the survey were identified by examining the archival use-of-
force data and selecting officers who deployed tasers during both the pre and posttest periods. 
Only those officers who deployed a taser during these time periods and who were still employed 
by the OPD, were chosen to participate in the survey. 
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University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board  (IRB) approval was obtained in 
June 2007 (See Appendix D). The survey instrument was administered via electronic mail using 
Internet-based survey software that delivered the survey instrument to the officers at their agency 
e-mail addresses. This method was chosen because this is the customary way for Orlando police 
officers to receive agency information and correspondence. This also was used to improve the 
response rate and the quality of responses. The identities of the respondents are known only to 
the researcher and will not be divulged. Respondents were provided access to the survey 
software through an online Web site link for an eight-week period, beginning July 7, 2007 and 
ending September 1, 2007.  
The recipients were provided several opportunities to participate in the survey. The 
survey instrument was originally sent to recipients on July 7, 2007.  A second message with the 
survey Web site link was sent on August 1, 2007 to those recipients who had not previously 
responded, and a final reminder message was sent to any additional recipients that had not 
responded on August 21, 2007. Once officers submitted their responses to the survey instrument, 
they could no longer access the web site. No surveys were received after August 27, 2007. A 
timeline is presented in Table 5 to depict when surveys were received.  
 
Table 5: Timeline of Receipt of Survey Responses 
Date that surveys were received Total number of 
surveys received 
% of surveys 
received 
July 7, 2007 – August 1,2007 104 73% 
August 2, 2007 – August 21, 2007 27 19% 
August 22, 2007 – September 1, 2007 12 8%  
Total 143* 100% 
* 13 surveys were excluded from the sample due to missing data leaving the survey sample at 130. 
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The survey instrument consisted of an informed consent form and forty questions that 
captured officers' perceptions of how the change in organizational policy relating to taser 
placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum has effected their safety and the safety of suspects in 
use-of-force encounters. The survey also captured the officers' demographic information, such as 
education level; job assignments during the archival data study period; rank during the test 
periods; agency tenure; and previous employment in law enforcement. A variety of subject areas, 
such as risk of injury to suspects, risk of injury to officers, the proper placement of the taser on 
the Use-of-Force Continuum and the effectiveness of the taser in subduing noncompliant or 
combative suspects were examined using officer survey responses. 
To assist the reader in understanding the composition of officers who were surveyed, 
Table 6 illustrates the comparisons between the survey sample, the sampling frame and the 
population of officers employed by the Orlando Police Department. An analysis of these data 
reveals that the survey sample contained responses from 11 (8.5%) Black officers, 99 (76.2%) 
White officers, 14 (10.8%) Hispanic  officers, 4 (3.1%) Asian officers, and 6 (4.7%) Native 
American or other officers.  The demographics of the Orlando Police Department are 137 
(18.9%) Black officers, 454 (62.8%) White officers, 107 (14.8%) Hispanic officers, 21 (2.9%) 
Asian officers, and 4 (.6 %) Native American or other officers. These data and the officer 
demographics from the archival use of force data and OPD are presented in Table 6.   
Data on similar sized police agencies was also examined. Using data provided by the 
United States Department of Justice Law Enforcement Management and Administrative 
Statistics survey (LEMAS) (2003) a comparison with the data from OPD was conducted. The 
officer racial and gender demographics of police agencies that serve populations from 100,000-
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249,999 are as follows: Black (11.9%), White (76.0%), Hispanic/Latino (9.1%), and Other2 
(3.0%).  The percentage of officers by gender is 89.0 % male and 11.0% female. This 
examination revealed that OPD employs more Black and Hispanic officers and fewer White 
officers than the national average for cities of similar size. The number of Asian and Other 
officers were comparable. The percentage of female officers is also slightly higher that the 
national average for similar sized agencies. 
 
Table 6: Sample Demographic Comparisons  
Variable Value Labels Survey Sample Force Population OPD Population 
  N % N % N %      
Race of Officer Black 11 8.5 66 19.8 137 18.9 
 White 99 76.7 229 68.8 454 62.8 
 Hispanic 14 10.9 24 7.2 107 14.8 
 Asian/Other 5 3.9 14 4.2 25 3.5      
  129 100.0 333 100.0 723 100.0 
        
Gender of Officer Male 119 91.5 293 87.9 606 83.9 
 Female 11 8.5 40 12.1 117 16.1      
  130 100.0 333 100.0 723 100. 
 
 
As shown in Table 6, Black officers were less likely than expected to respond to the 
survey. Similarly, white officers appeared to respond more often than the sampling frame would 
predict. In order to test if there are significant differences in these key demographic variables a 
chi-square test was run on these key demographic variables. This test is important to make sure 
that the respondents chosen match or are at least representative of the population sampled.  In 
this case, since the sampling frame was officers from OPD, that used a taser in this time period. 
                                                 
2 The other category includes Asians, Native Hawaiians, or other Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Alaska 
Natives, and any other race. 
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Comparisons are also made between the survey sample and those that used force during the 
archival data period and the entire population of OPD officers. The first comparison tells us if 
there is a representative sample. The second comparison examines how well the sampling frame 
compares to the larger population of officers employed by OPD. And the final comparison 
examines how well the sample compared to OPD in general. While each of these comparisons 
shed light on the sample, the critical one is the initial test that compares the sample to the sample 
of officers who used force.   
 
Table 7: Chi-Square Test for Difference in Populations of Officers in Opposing Samples 
Variable Samples Compared Chi Square Sig. df 
Race Survey Sample to Force Population 9.47* .024 3 
 Force Population to OPD 12.29* .006 3 
 Survey to OPD 11.38* .007 3 
     
Gender Survey Sample to Force Population 1.2 .272 1 
 Force Population to OPD 3.13 .076 1 
 Survey to OPD 5.15* .023 1 
* Difference is significant at the .05 for a two tailed test 
 
 
As shown in Table 7, there are significant race differences between each of the 
populations. It appears that since fewer blacks and more whites responded to the survey this 
would indicate a possible problem with the representativeness of the sample.  However, when the 
gender composition of the samples is examined, there is no difference between the survey 
sample and the sampling frame, for the sampling frame and the population of OPD. The only 
difference is between the survey sample and the general population of officers employed by 
OPD.  This difference is likely the result of the difference in the overall population sizes between 
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these two samples and the way a chi square test calculates the differences in the frequency 
expected for each cell.  
Despite finding that there is a difference in the racial composition between the three 
samples and a difference in the gender composure between the sample and the general 
population of officers employed by OPD, the chi square test tells us little about where the 
differences occur. A cursory examination of Table 6 shows where these differences are likely to 
be (black & white). To confirm this casual observation, a Z-test for the differences in proportions 
was conducted. The results are depicted in Table 8.   
 
Table 8: Z-Test for Difference in Proportions of Officers in Opposing Samples  
Variable Variable 
Label 
Survey to Force 
Population 
Force 
Population to 
OPD 
Survey to OPD 
  Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.  
Race Black -2.92* .003 .333 .738 -2.88* .004 
 White  1.69 .090 1.857 .059 3.058* .002 
 Hispanic 1.27 .200 -3.48* .000 -1.18 .236 
 Asian/Other .159 .873 .598 .550 .237 .812 
        
Gender Male/Female 1.10 .272 1.77 .076 2.27* .023 
* Difference is significant at the .05 for a two tailed test.  
 
 
The Z test for the difference in proportions extends the chi-square test analysis by 
examining specific categories and identifying exactly where there is a difference. As shown in 
Table 8, this test (z=-2.92, p=.003) statistically confirms that black officers were 
underrepresented in the survey sample compared to the sampling frame. This is an issue that 
needs further discussion. While blacks responded to the survey less often than would be expected 
given the sampling frame and which raises questions regarding the representativeness of the 
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sample, it does not mean that the survey results can not be used.  The extant literature on the use 
of force is fairly consistent in finding that not only are black officers more likely to be deployed 
in areas where force is used more often, but they also use force on average more often than 
whites (Alpert, Dunham & MacDonald, 2004; Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1979, 1987, Reiss, 1971).  
While this literature has not been extended into the use of taser per se, we can infer that it is 
likely that if black officers use force more often, then it is likely that they will also be more 
accepting of a wide variety of force options including the use of tasers.  In fact, when looking at 
the basic demographics of officers who used tasers, 15 percent of the force situations involved 
black officers in the pre-test and 21 percent of these same incidents involved this group in the 
post test.  Further, blacks only comprised 8.5 percent of the survey sample and 19.8 percent of 
officers that were in the sampling frame who used force. What shows is that black officers 
apparently used tasers more often than expected. Using this logic, it is likely that despite the fact 
that fewer back officers responded to the survey, the survey results may in all likelihood be a 
conservative estimate of the true opinion of officers because black officers may be more 
approving than their white, Hispanic or Asian peers. This however is an open empirical question 
and one that needs to be addressed by future research.   
A review of data comparing officers who used taser to the officers at OPD reveals that 
there where fewer Hispanic officers who used tasers than expected. This finding may indicate 
that these officers were assigned in different places within the police department and had less 
opportunity to use tasers. The analysis comparing the survey respondents to all OPD officers 
reveals that there are fewer black officers, and more white officers that responded than one 
would expect just by looking at the racial composition of OPD.  
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An analysis of officer gender between the three groups was also conducted.  There are no 
difference in gender between the survey sample and the force population (z=1.10, p=.272), nor is 
there any difference between the officers who used force and OPD (z=1.77, p=.076).  However, 
there is a difference in the gender composition of survey respondents and OPD (z=2.27, p=.023).  
This difference can be explained because only officers who used a taser in this time period were 
sampled and it doesn’t appear that female officers used them as often as male officers. 
Research Design 
Study Variables Archival Data 
 This explanatory research design identifies the independent variable as the change in 
organizational policy on taser use. The dependent variables are the frequency of taser 
deployments; the level (severity) of suspect resistance encountered by officers; the frequency of 
suspect injuries; the severity of suspect injuries; and the frequency of officer injuries related to 
taser use. Table 9 provides definitions for these dependent variables.  
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Table 9: Definitions of Study Variables—Archival Data 
Variable Name Variable 
type 
Description Data Source 
Taser frequency  
before policy change 
Continuous Total number of taser deployments 
during the specified period/total # of 
arrests 
Pre-existing 
data/defensive tactics 
forms 
Taser frequency after 
policy change  
Continuous Total number of taser deployments 
during the specified period/ total # 
of arrests 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Suspect resistance to 
taser before policy 
change  
Ordinal 1 passive resistance 
2 active physical resistance 
3 aggressive physical 
   resistance 
4 deadly force resistance 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Suspect resistance to 
taser after policy 
change  
Ordinal 1 passive resistance 
2 active physical resistance 
3 aggressive physical 
   resistance 
4 deadly force resistance 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Officer injured before 
policy change  
Dichotomous 0 no injury 
1 injury 
 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Officer injured after 
policy change 
Dichotomous 0 no injury 
1 injury 
 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Suspect injured before 
policy change 
Dichotomous 0 no injury 
1 injury 
 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Suspect injured after 
policy change  
 
Dichotomous 0 no injury 
1 injury 
 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Severity of suspect 
injury 
Interval 1 no injuries 
2 standard injuries 
3 abrasions, scratches  
4 lacerations 
5 hospital treatment required     
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
 
Study Variables Survey Data 
The study variables relating to the survey instrument capture officer perceptions in a 
variety of subject areas related to the effect of the policy change on the risk of injury to suspects, 
the risk of injury to officers, the proper taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum, and the 
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effectiveness of the taser in subduing noncompliant or combative suspects. Table 10 provides 
definitions for these specific variables. 
 
Table 10: Definitions of Study Variables—Survey Data 
Variable Name Variable type Description Data Source 
Officer perception— 
increased risk to officer 
after policy change 
Ordinal 1   Strongly Disagree 
2   Disagree Somewhat
3   Uncertain     
4   Agree Somewhat      
5   Strongly Agree 
Officer 
Survey responses 
Officer perception—
proper placement of 
taser on Use-of-Force 
Continuum 
Ordinal 1   Strongly Disagree 
2   Disagree Somewhat
3   Uncertain     
4   Agree Somewhat      
5   Strongly Agree 
Officer 
Survey responses 
Officer perception—
decreased frequency of 
taser use after policy 
change 
Ordinal 1   Strongly Disagree 
2   Disagree Somewhat
3   Uncertain     
4   Agree Somewhat      
5   Strongly Agree 
Officer 
Survey responses 
 
Officer perception— 
less able to control 
suspects after policy 
change 
Ordinal 1   Strongly Disagree 
2   Disagree Somewhat
3   Uncertain     
4   Agree Somewhat      
5   Strongly Agree 
Officer 
Survey responses 
 
Officer perception—
placement of OC at 
level 4 appropriate for 
most use-of-force 
encounters 
Ordinal 1   Strongly Disagree 
2   Disagree Somewhat
3   Uncertain     
4   Agree Somewhat      
5   Strongly Agree 
Officer 
Survey responses 
 
 
Control Variables 
Control variables for this study are situational level variables obtained from the use-of-
force encounters. These include suspect age, sex, and race; the number of other officers present 
during the encounter; the presence of citizen bystanders; the seriousness of the encounter; and 
whether or not the incident was a call for service or a self-initiated contact. These variables are 
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consistent with research designs used in other studies of police use of force (Riksheim & 
Chermak, 1993; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Table 11 provides definitions for these control 
variables. 
 
Table 11: Definitions of Control Variables 
Variable Name Variable type Description Data Source 
Suspect race  Nominal 1   Black 
2   White 
3   Hispanic     
4   Asian 
5   Other 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Suspect gender Nominal 1   male 
0   female 
 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Suspect age Interval 1   under 12 
2   13-17 
3   18-20     
4   21-29 
5   30-44 
6   45-59 
7   60+ 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Number of officers present  Interval 1   one 
2   two 
3   three    
4   four 
5   more than four 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Number of citizen 
bystanders 
Interval 0   none 
1   one 
2   two 
3   three    
4   four 
5   more than four 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
The type of incident that 
led to the use-of-force 
encounter 
Interval 1   Low threat 
2   Medium threat 
3   High threat  
 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
Officer-initiated or call for 
police service 
Dichotomous 1   Self initiated by officer 
0   Call for police service 
 
Pre-existing data/ 
defensive tactics forms 
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Analysis of the Data 
The unit of analysis for this study is use-of-force encounters. Existing use-of-force data 
was examined to form data sets in each of the identified categories. The research questions were 
addressed by first determining the types and frequencies of the force levels employed and 
resistance levels encountered in each incident. This strategy is consistent with research designs 
employed by Croft (1985), Meyer (1992), McLaughlin (1992) and Garner et al. (1996).  
This analysis examined two separate sets of data to determine if the change in 
organizational policy had an effect on taser use and the outcomes of the encounter. The first data 
set was archival in nature and was coded directly from the use-of-force forms maintained by the 
OPD. The second data set was a survey consisting of multiple questions designed to see if the 
perceptions of officers matched the reality of actual use. These data sets are explained more fully 
in Chapter 4. The statistical methods discussed below were used to analyze the data 
Z Test for the Difference in Two Proportions 
The Z test for the differences in two proportions is designed to determine whether there is 
a difference between two population proportions and whether one is larger than the other. This 
test was applied to the data for the frequency of taser use in the pretest and posttest groups. To 
test the null hypothesis that the two proportions are equal a two-tailed test is used. A one-tailed 
test is used when trying to determine if one proportion is greater (or lower) than another 
(Weisburd, 1998). 
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Chi Square Tests 
    The Pearson’s Chi square test is a nonparametric statistical test that seeks to determine if 
two or more variables are distributed equally. This statistic is used to test the hypothesis of no 
association of the identified variable data (Norušis, 2005). Chi square testing was done on the 
research questions relating to the frequency of injuries to suspects and the frequency of injuries 
to officers. These questions both use nominal level variables. This testing method also was 
applied to certain nominal-level individual and situational variables.   
Independent Samples T Tests 
An independent samples t-test is used to compare the mean scores of two different groups 
of people or conditions to determine if there is a significant difference between the groups. 
Independent samples t tests were conducted on the research questions relating to the levels of 
suspect resistance and the severity of injuries to suspects (Norušis, 2005). Both of these variables 
were treated as interval-level variables consistent with the framework laid out by Menard (1995). 
Menard claims that categorical variables such as Likert scales can be treated as interval level 
data if:  (a) people believe them to be interval;  (b) there is a true ordering to the data;  (c) you 
have more than two categories and (d) the data are normally distributed. This testing method also 
was applied to certain interval-level individual and situational variables.  
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression were applied to the research questions relating to the 
levels of suspect resistance and the severity of injuries to suspects, both of which were treated as 
interval-level variables. The use of the regression test extends the bivariate analysis already 
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provided by t tests. This test allows for identifying when a change in the nature or direction of 
the relationship occurs when the effects of significant variables are controlled (Menard, 1995; 
Schroeder et al, 1986; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of organizational policy changes 
regarding the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum on deployments and 
officer’s perceptions of taser effectiveness. Officers’ perceptions of taser effectiveness after the 
change in placement for authorized taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum were also 
examined. The question explored in this study is whether there is a relationship between officer 
attitudes related to the use of force regarding the taser and their subsequent perception of taser 
effectiveness. This study examines one agency’s experiences with tasers during two separate 
time periods, using archival use of force and officer survey data. 
This study uses two sources of data: (1) agency use-of-force archival data and (2) survey 
data from taser-equipped officers. The archival data were gathered from the Orlando Police 
Department (OPD) during two separate 12-month periods. These data collection time periods 
capture use-of-force incidents that occurred one year before and one year after the organizational 
policy change regarding taser placement in the Use-of-Force Continuum. The OPD in Orlando, 
Florida, was selected as the site for this research because of its size, the length of time tasers 
have been in use, and the fact that the agency changed its policy regarding placement of the taser 
on the Use-of-Force Continuum. OPD compares favorably with other large metropolitan police 
agencies of similar size and composition.  
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Use of force data from OPD before the change in policy to a higher level of force 
comprises the first data set for analysis. The second set of archival data examines data after the 
change in policy to determine what effect, if any, the change had on several identified areas. 
Survey data from actual taser users was collected to capture officer perceptions of the effect on 
taser use after the organizational change. This survey data was examined and compared to use-
of-force forms to determine if officer’s perceptions and the gathered archival data reflect similar 
patterns and findings. 
Survey data was also used to examine the perceptions of officers related to the effect of 
the change in organizational policy on taser deployments. The officers surveyed were selected 
from a sample of taser-equipped officers. These officers were identified through the examination 
of the archival data, and they must have used a taser during both of the time periods examined in 
this study. 
This chapter has described the methodology and research plan for this study, including 
the examination of use-of-force forms to capture archival data, the development of the survey 
instrument, the selection of the survey recipients, and the plan for distribution of the survey to 
officers. Chapter 4 describes the data used in this study, both from archival use-of-force data and 
data acquired through the user survey. In addition, Chapter 4 reports on the analyses of these data 
in the empirical tests of this study’s hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
Problem Statement and Significance of Research 
 The use of tasers by police has been the subject of considerable debate and scrutiny since 
their introduction as a less-than-lethal weapon in the late 1970s (IACP, 2004). This controversy 
has been revitalized with the introduction of a newer generation of weapons in the late 1990s 
(Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; McBride & Tedder, 2005). These weapons are more powerful and 
have been deployed extensively by police agencies across the United States and abroad. There is 
a limited body of research on the use and effects of tasers. The majority of this research focuses 
on the effectiveness of tasers and how frequently they are deployed in use-of-force encounters. A 
review of current literature reveals no empirical research on the placement of tasers in the Use-
of-Force Continuum. Additionally, no research studies have been conducted that examine this 
change in use-of-force policy to determine its effect on taser deployments or officers’ attitudes 
related to taser effectiveness. 
This study attempts to fill this void by examining taser use prior to, and after the 
implementation of, a policy change on taser placement in the Use-of-Force Continuum. In 
practice, it is obvious that police leaders have attempted to mitigate and manage the use of tasers 
by modifying organizational policies particularly related to high-risk situations to protect officers 
or suspects. The mechanism that most police agencies use to guide officers in use-of-force 
encounters is the Use-of-Force Continuum (Conner, 1991).  
The purpose of this research study is to examine the effects of an organizational policy 
change that alters the taser placement in the Use-of-Force Continuum. Using archival use-of-
force and survey data, this study examines one agency’s experiences with tasers during two 
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separate time periods. The period one year before the organizational change in policy that altered 
the placement of the taser on the resistance and response continuum to a higher level of 
resistance will comprise the first data set for analysis3. The second set of archival data examines 
data one year after the policy change to determine what effect, if any, the change had on several 
identified variables. To attempt to capture officer perceptions of organizational change, survey 
data from taser users was also collected. This data will be examined to determine if officers' 
perceptions and actual taser use statistics reflect similar patterns and findings.  
Archival Use-of-Force Data  
 The policy change that is the subject of this study was made in an attempt to decrease the 
use of tasers in low-intensity encounters by increasing the level of resistance that must be present 
to authorize deployment. Essentially, the change raised the level of resistance from passive 
resistance to active resistance. This means that suspects must be actively resisting the actions of 
the officer—by pulling away or fleeing, not just passively resisting—for a taser to be deployed. 
For the purposes of this examination, data was captured both before and after the policy change. 
 During both of the identified time periods for analysis 890 use-of-force incidents with a 
taser were recorded by Orlando police officers. This data was separated into two samples, 
labeled Pretest and Posttest. In the period between June 4, 2003 and June 3, 2004, one year prior 
to the policy change (Pretest), officers recorded 523 taser uses. In the period between June 5, 
2004 and June 5, 2005, one year after the policy change (Posttest), officers recorded 367 taser 
                                                 
3 The terms resistance and response continuum are unique to the OPD when referring to their Use-of-Force 
Continuum. This terminology is used interchangeably throughout this study.   
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uses. Descriptive statistics for situational level characteristics of the suspects are presented in 
Table 12 below.  
 
Table 12: Situational Level Variables—OPD Use-of-Force Report Data—Pretest/Posttest 
 Total Sample Pretest Posttest   
Variable Value N Pct N Pct N Pct Test Statistic Sig. Value 
Suspect Race           
 Black 461 51.8 273 52.2 188 51.2   
 White 315 35.4 189 36.1 126 34.3 x2=5.178 .270 
 Hispanic 111 12.5 61 11.7 50 13.6   
 Asian 2 .2 0 0 2 .5   
 Other 1 .1 0 0 1 .3        
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0   
          
Suspect Gender          
 Male 820 92.1 474 90.6 346 94.3   
 Female 70 x2=3.958 .047*7.9 49 9.4 21 5.7       
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0   
          
Suspect Age          
 Under 12 3 .3 3 0.6 0 0   
 13-17 50 5.6 26 5.1 24 6.5   
 18-20 88 9.9 61 12.0 27 7.5   
 21-29 383 43.0 211 41.4 172 47.3 T=.164 .870 
 30-44 278 31.2 168 32.9 110 30.0   
 45-59 60 6.7 38 7.5 22 5.4   
 60+ 6 .7 3 0.6 3 0.8   
 Unknown 22 2.5 13 2.5 10 2.6        
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0   
 
 
The descriptive statistics on the individual-level suspect variables were unremarkable. As 
expected, the majority of suspects encountered in use-of-force encounters were males (92.1%).  
Unformed Crime Report data and prior research have found that males are involved in 80 % of 
all violent encounters (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Garner et al. 1995, 1996; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002).   
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An examination of the suspect race and age data revealed that a majority of suspects 
(51%) were Black, (35%) were White, (12%) of the suspects were Hispanic and (.3 %) were 
Asian or Other. The majority of suspects (43%) were between 21-29 years of age. Only (5%) of 
the suspects were juveniles. 
 As shown in Table 12, there does not appear to be an appreciable difference in the 
situational-level variables related to the suspects between the two reporting periods. Both the age 
(T=.164, df=866,  p=.870) and race (chi square value=5.178, df=4,  p=.270) of these individuals 
appeared to be relatively the same. However, tasers appear to have been used less against 
females in the period after the policy change than before. This difference is statistically 
significant (chi square value=3.958, df=1,  p=.047). It is probable that since females are not as 
likely to engage officers in hand-to-hand fighting, officers may have been less prone to use these 
electronic devices in use-of-force scenarios, especially after this shift in policy. 
For comparison purposes, key situational variable data relevant to the police-citizen 
encounters are presented in Table 13. These data are stratified by the period in which they 
occurred. The table illustrates these subdivisions and tests to see if there is a significant 
difference between the two periods based on these situational variables, using either chi-square 
or t-tests. Chi square tests were run on the variables suspect injured, officer injured, and officer 
self-initiated variables. Chi square tests were used to determine if the nominal variables in the 
study models are related. Independent sample t- tests were used to conduct means testing. A t- 
test was run on number of officers, suspects and citizens present, severity of suspect injury, level 
of suspect resistance and threat level as these were treated as interval-level variables.  
Individual-level variable data on the officers involved in police-citizen encounters are  
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also presented in Table 13. Chi square tests were run on the variables officer gender and officer 
race. T-tests were run on the variables officer tenure and officer age.  
 
Table 13: Situational Level Variables—OPD Use-of-Force Report Data—Pretest/Posttest  
  Total 
Sample 
Pretest Posttest   
Variable                            Value Label N Pct N Pct N Pct Test Statistic Sig. Value
Officers Present During Encounter         
 1 603 67.8 354 67.7 249 67.8   
 2 221 24.8 130 24.9 91 24.8   
 3 53 6.0 34 6.5 19 5.2 T =-.225 .822 
 4 11 1.2 4 .8 7 1.9   
 5 2 0.2 1 .2 1 .3        
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0367 100.0   
Number of Suspects          
 1 868 97.5 508 97.1 360 98.1   
 2 18 2.0 12 2.3 6 1.6   
 3 3 0.3 2 .4 1 .3 T=1.093 .275 
 4 1 0.1 1 .2 0 0        
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0367 100.0   
Officers Injured          
 No 839 94.3 499 95.4 340 92.6 x2=3.059 .080 
 Yes 51 5.7 24 4.6 27 7.4        
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0367 100.0   
Suspect Injured          
 No 243 27.3 139 26.6 104 28.3 x2=.337 .562 
 Yes 647 72.7 384 73.4 263 71.7       
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0367 100.0   
Suspect Injury Type          
 No Injury 243 27.3 139 26.6 104 28.3   
 Standard 439 49.3 268 51.2 171 46.6   
 Scratches and 
Abrasions 
148 16.6 88 16.8 60 16.3 T=-.929 .353 
 Lacerations 47 5.3 23 4.4 24 6.5   
 Medical Treatment 13 1.5 5 1.0 8 2.2       
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0367 100.0   
          
Suspect Resistance          
 Passive Resistance 46 5.2 38 7.3 8 2.2   
 Active Resistance 713 80.1 427 81.6 286 77.9   
 Aggressive Resistance 126 14.2 57 10.9 69 18.8 T=-4.847 .000* 
 Deadly Force 5 0.6 1 .2 4 1.1       
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0367 100.0   
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  Total Sample Pretest Posttest   
Variable                Value Label N Pct N Pct N Pct Test Statistic Sig. Value 
Threat or Seriousness of Encounter          
 Low Threat 274 30.8 170 32.5 104 28.3   
 Medium Threat 458 51.5 267 51.1 191 52.0 T=-1.576 .115 
 High Threat 158 17.8 86 16.4 72 19.6       
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0  
          
Number of Citizen Bystanders          
 0 563 63.4 342 65.4 221 60.2   
 1 156 17.7 91 17.4 65 17.7   
 2 89 9.8 49 9.4 40 10.9   
 3 46 5.2 23 4.4 23 6.3 T=-1.820 .069 
 4 24 2.5 10 1.9 14 3.8   
 More than 4 4 1.3 8 1.5 4 1.1       
 Total 890 100.0 5235 100.0 367 100.0   
          
Officer Self Initiated          
 yes 473 53.1 276 52.8 197 53.7 x2=.071 .790 
 no 417 46.9 247 47.2 170 46.3       
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0   
          
Officer Gender          
 Male 841 94.4 503 96.1 338 92.0   
 Female 49 x2=6.893 .009*5.6 20 3.9 29 8.0       
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0   
          
Officer Race           
 Black 158 17.8 80 15.3 78 21.2   
 White 625 70.3 378 72.3 247 67.4 x2=15.868 .003* 
 Hispanic 71 7.9 41 7.9 30 8.2   
 Asian 29 3.3 23 4.4 6 1.6   
 Other 7 .7 1 .1 6 1.6        
 Total 890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0   
          
Officer Tenure  N Pct        
 1-5 54 16.3       
 6-10 146 43.8       
 11-15 58 17.4     T=.700 .484 
 16-20 61 18.3       
 21-30 13 3.9       
 30+ 1 .3        
  333 100.0       
          
          
 85
   
 Total Sample         
Variable Value N Pct     Test Statistic Sig. Value 
Officer Age          
 21-25 2 .6       
 26-30 27 8.1       
 31-40 167 50.1     T=.951 .342 
 41-50 117 35.1       
 51-60 19 5.7       
 61+ 0 0        
 Total 333 100.0       
  
 
According to the extant literature, one of the prime determinants of the nature of police- 
citizen encounters involves situational-level elements. In fact, Freidrich (1980) separated his 
analysis into three different levels (individual, situational, and organizational) and found that 
situational-level variables are oftentimes the most important. These situational variables include 
data on the suspect (race, gender, age or size) and data on the type of encounter (self-initiated, 
felony crime in progress, or traffic stop). Individual level variables typically involve data related 
to the officer (tenure, levels of education) or officer demographics. Hence, it is prudent to 
examine these situational-level variables across both time periods to see if there is a difference 
between them. If there is a difference, it could indicate that tasers are being used almost 
exclusively in very dangerous situations. However, if there is no difference, it could be an 
indicator that these contextual variables play little role in an officer's decision to use this less-
than-lethal weapon.   
 In this regard, it is prudent to examine the number of officers present at a given 
encounter. A high number of officers tends to indicate a tense situation where there is likely to be 
a possibility of injury to either the officer or a suspect. However, when we examine the data, 
there does not appear to be any difference in the number of officers present at these use-of-force 
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encounters. T-tests were run to confirm this and failed to reach the required level to claim that 
there were appreciable differences regarding this variable (T =-.255, df=888, p=.822).   
 Data on the number of suspects present during an encounter was also examined. This is 
also an important factor as the number of suspects present might be a significant influence on the 
level of force used. Again, t-tests were run to confirm this and failed to reach the required level 
to claim that there were appreciable differences related to this variable (T =-1.093, df=887.992, 
p=.275).   
As far as injuries to officers were concerned, these data indicate that officers were not 
injured any more frequently in the posttest period. A chi square test was run, and it was 
determined that there was no higher probability of officers being injured in the posttest period 
(chi square value =3.059, df =1, p=.080). This finding does not reach the level of statistical 
significance at the .05 level. Given the small sample size ( N=890),  a larger sample of archival 
data might produce a different result.  Further research with a larger sample is needed to more 
thoroughly investigate this research question. 
Data on the frequency of suspect injury were also examined. The data indicate that the 
difference in the percentages of suspect injury was not statistically significant. In fact, when a chi 
square test was run, there was no difference in the likelihood of a suspect being injured either 
before or after the change in policy (chi square value =.337, df =1, p=.562). This is likely 
because all of those who are in the sample suffered the same type of injury from the penetration 
of the taser darts. 
Additional data were collected on the nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the 
suspects. Treating this variable as an interval-level measure since there was some ordering to the 
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data, a t-test was run and it confirmed that there was no statistical difference in the severity of the 
injuries suffered in either period (T=-.929, df =721.935, p=.353).   
Also examined were data on suspect resistance. The pattern clearly shows that suspects 
tended to resist at higher levels in the posttest period, which was consistent with the 
organizational change in policy that raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum 
when tasers can be used. Based on t-test results, the difference is statistically significant at the 
.05 level (T=-4.847, df =749.620, p =.000). An examination of data on the level of suspect 
resistance reveals that in 8 uses of force incidents in the posttest group (after the change in 
policy) the suspects were resisting at a passive level of resistance when a taser was deployed. 
Anecdotally, this would seem to indicate that the use of tasers in these low intensity incidents 
violated the agency policy. The incident data reveals that 7 of the 8 events occurred within four 
weeks of the policy change between June 5, 2004 and July 6, 2004. This may indicate that some 
officers had not yet adjusted to the policy change or that a training issue could be to blame. 
There was no distinct pattern or other common variables in these events. Each of these incidents 
involved different officers. The types of incidents that led to these uses of force were from a 
variety of low, medium and high threat level encounters. Half of these incidents involved officer 
self initiated action and the other were dispatched. These incidents only comprise 2.2% of the 
total posttest data.  
The effect of threat level or seriousness of the encounter was also examined. The level of 
threat encountered by officers was not found to be statistically significant, which was confirmed 
by t-tests (T =-1.576, df=888, p=.115). It was not expected that the threat levels would change 
between the pretest and posttest groups. The data examined relating to police activity remained 
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very constant between the three threat level categories, with the majority falling into the low or 
medium threat-level categories in both the pre and posttest groups. 
Data on the presence of citizen bystanders were also examined. Using a one-tailed 
solution, a significant difference in presence or number of citizen bystanders was found. In this 
case, there were more citizens present in the typical posttest use of force incident than in the 
pretest, indicating the situations where tasers were used were more likely more serious and had a 
higher probably of escalating to a more violent and volatile encounter. This was determined by a 
t-test (T =-1.820, df=745.311, p=.069). A one-tailed solution was used because prior research has 
identified the presence of citizens as having an effect on the levels of police force, this was not a 
significant factor in this data set. This finding could also be explained by the increased public 
awareness of the controversy surrounding taser use by police.  It is possible that taser usage by 
police may have aroused more public curiosity after the media attention regarding its use. This 
would account for the presence of more citizen bystanders in the posttest group.   
The influence of officer self-initiated contacts versus dispatched calls for service was also 
examined using a chi square test (chi square value = .071, df =1, p= .790). An analysis of this 
data indicates that there was no statistically significant difference in the levels of officer self-
initiated or dispatched calls for service in either the pretest or posttest groups.    
These preliminary analyses show that, for the most part, there are very few differences in 
the situational characteristics (suspect race, gender, and age) or the characteristics related to the 
incident (number of officers present, number of suspects present, officers injured, suspects 
injured, suspect injury type, suspect level of resistance, threat level of the encounter, number of 
citizen bystanders present, and whether or not the encounter was officer-initiated or a call for 
service) in the encounters between the pretest and posttest. The only major differences between 
 89
   
these variables appeared to be with suspects; namely, officers generally used taser less against 
females. 
Various research studies have examined the influence of officer demographics on police-
citizen encounters (Garner et al. 1995, 1996; Terrill, 2001, 2003). The influence of individual 
level variables related to officers involved in use of force encounters were also examined in this 
study. Officer age, gender, race and agency tenure were all examined to determine if the 
influence of  these variables was statistically significant. There does not appear to be a 
measurable difference in the individual-level variables related to the officers’ age and experience 
between the pretest and posttest periods. Both the age (T=.951, df=888,  p=.342) and tenure 
(T=.700, df=888,  p=.484) of the officers appeared to be relatively the same in the both groups. It 
does appears that female officers used force 4.9% more often in the posttest group (chi 
square=6.893, df=1, p=.009). Also found to be significant was the influence of officer race in use 
of force encounters between the pretest and posttest groups (chi square=15.868, df=4, p=.003). 
An examination of the data on officer race reveals that while white officers used force 4.9 % less 
often in the posttest period, black officers used force 5.9% more often.  This is an interesting 
finding that warrants further examination and study. Use of force incidents by Hispanic, Asian, 
and other officers did not significantly change. As far as the situational-level variables related to 
event itself, officers appeared to use tasers, on average, more against suspects that were offering 
more aggressive resistance, and where there was a crowd assembled. 
The following research questions are related to the examination of the archival use-of-
force data. By having some background knowledge of the sample data on use of force, this 
allows us to move forward and begin testing the research questions of interest.   
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Research Questions from Archival Use-of-Force Data 
 One of the principal concerns of taser use and one of the reasons why it generates public 
interest is the issue of how often and when tasers are used in use-of-force incidents. The policy 
changes that were implemented by the OPD were specifically designed to reduce taser use by 
imposing more stringent restrictions as to when officers’ can use tasers. This makes examining 
what effect the policy change has had on the frequency of taser use a significant area of study.  
Research Question 1: Frequency of Taser Deployments 
Research Question 1, related to the frequency of taser deployments, posited that raising 
the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for taser deployment has decreased the 
frequency of taser deployments. The related null hypothesis posed that raising the authorized 
level for taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum has had no effect on the frequency of taser use 
by officers. The hypotheses for this research question are given below. 
H01: Raising the authorized level for taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum has had no 
effect on the frequency of taser use by officers.  
H11: Raising the authorized level for taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum has 
decreased the frequency of taser use by officers. 
 
To address this question, one can simply count the number of deployments and see if the 
raw frequency has increased. However, that would not provide the reader with an adequate 
picture of the probability of true deployments because most use-of-force incidents usually 
coincide with an arrest. If there were more arrests in the pretest period, then the raw frequency 
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would be inflated. Thus, the only way to get an adequate picture and/or understanding of this is 
to use a test that measures differences of proportions.   
To address this research question, OPD call-for-service, arrest, and total uses of force 
data during the pre and posttest periods was examined. During the pretest period, from June 2003 
through June 2004, OPD officers handled 337,470 calls for service, made 19,267 arrests, and 
used all types of authorized force in 707 incidents. This includes the use of OC spray, ASP 
baton, and weaponless tactics such as strikes and takedowns. During the posttest period, from 
June 2004 through June 2005, OPD officers handled 383,567 calls for service, made 19,770 
arrests and used force in 572 encounters. The use of call-for-service, arrest, and use of force data 
to address the question of the effect on frequency of taser resulting from the organizational 
change is warranted based on the fluctuation in the crime rate and accompanying police activity 
used to counter it during the analysis periods. An examination of Uniformed Crime Report data 
for Orlando during the periods of analysis reveals a 3% reduction in the index crime rate per 
100,000 populations between 2003 and 2004. It is important to note that only the six months of 
June through December 2003 are included in the analysis period. The change in index crime rate 
between 2004 and 2005 was recorded as a 3.5% increase (FDLE, 2003, 2004, 2005). The 
analysis period ended in June 2005. These data are three such measures of that activity and are 
used to demonstrate the overall increase in police activity during the study periods and then to 
incorporate taser deployment data to test hypotheses on the effect of the organizational change 
relating to when the taser could be used. 
During the pretest period 523 taser deployments were recorded in use-of-force encounters 
by officers. The numbers of taser deployments during the posttest period were 367, indicating 
that the number of deployments dropped by 156 actual uses or 29 %. The total numbers of use of 
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force by officers also decreased by 135 incidents, or 19%, from 707 to 572 in the pretest and 
posttest periods. To analyze these data the proper way, a Z test for the difference in proportions 
was applied to the arrests, calls for service, and total use of force encounter data in the pretest 
and posttest samples. The results are illustrated in Table14.  
 
Table 14: Z Test for Difference in Proportions in Taser Deployments in the Pre and Posttest 
Periods Using Number of Arrests, Calls for Service, and Use of Force Data 
 Arrests Calls for 
Service 
Total Use of Force 
Encounters 
Z-Values 5.68 7.15 3.83 
Critical Values (1.65) (1.65) (1.65) 
 
 
The Z test for the differences in two proportions is designed to determine whether there is 
a difference between two population proportions and whether one is larger than the other which 
is a one-tailed test. To use this test, certain assumptions must be met. These are: (1) independent 
samples, (2) a normal binomial distribution, and (3) a large enough sample size (np ≥ 5 and n[1-
p] ≥5 for each population). For purposes of this analysis, all of these assumptions have been met.  
 
The following formula was used to compute the Z test: 
 
Z = (p s1 – p s2) – (p1 – p2) 
√ ׀p׀(1 – ׀p׀) {1/n1 + 1/n2} 
Figure 2: Calculation of the Test Statistic 
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After computing the Z test using arrest data, the Z value was 5.68, and the critical value 
was 1.65. Therefore, since the Z value was higher than its critical value, this result supports that 
there is a difference in proportion between the ratio of taser uses/arrests between the pre and 
posttest samples. After computing the Z test using call-for-service data, the Z value was 7.15, 
and the critical value of Z was 1.65. Since the Z value was higher than its critical value, we can 
also claim that there is a difference in proportion between the ratio of taser uses/call for service 
between the pre and posttest samples. Using the same Z test analysis with total use of force data, 
the Z value was 3.83, and the critical value of Z was 1.65. Since the Z value was higher than its 
critical value, we can also claim that there is a difference in proportion between the ratio of taser 
uses/total use of forces between the pre and posttest samples. 
Using arrest, calls-for-service, and use of force data for analysis the findings are that 
tasers were used more frequently in the pretest sample. This finding substantiates a reduction of 
taser use in the posttest sample. A reduction in overall use of force incidents was also found. 
Based on this finding, we can reject the null hypothesis and state that the change in 
organizational policy related to taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum may have had a 
significant effect on the frequency of taser use. That change is a measurable reduction in the 
frequency of taser use after the change in organizational policy. 
 The level of resistance offered by suspects in a use-of-force encounter is one of the 
fundamental questions of this study. The policy change examined specifically raises the required 
level of resistance that must be present for the taser to be used. The effect on levels of suspect 
resistance after the policy change is the focus of the research question addressed below. 
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Research Question 2: Level of Suspect Resistance 
Research Question 2 posed if raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum 
for taser deployment would result in deployments that are more serious when the suspect actively 
resists the officer to a greater degree. The null hypothesis related to this question states that there 
is no difference in the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers after the change in 
organizational policy. For this research question, the research and null hypotheses are: 
 
H02: There is no difference in the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers 
after the change in organizational police. 
H12: There will be a difference in levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers 
after the change in organizational police. 
 
An independent samples t-test and regression analysis was completed to test this 
hypothesis. An independent samples t-test is used to compare the mean scores of two different 
groups of people or conditions to determine if there is a significant difference between the 
groups (Norušis, 2005).   
Group statistics for pre and posttest results from the variable suspect resistance are given 
in Table 15. These results indicate that the mean result for the pretest group was 2.04, with a 
Standard Deviation (SD) of .434. The mean for the posttest group was 2.19, with a SD of .468. 
The results for the independent samples t-test were significant at the .000 level, suggesting that 
there was indeed a difference between the levels of resistance offered by suspects between the 
two reporting periods. While it is easy to say that the means or distributions are different, it is 
difficult to state that this one specific finding provides direct support to the hypothesis that the 
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change in policy was the sole reason why suspects resisted less. However what would provide 
more support is if the inclusion of additional correlates does not diminish the differences found 
here. Hence, a multiple regression equation was run to check and make sure that higher levels of 
resistance are not caused by some other factor. The use of a multiple regression test extends the 
bivariate analysis. This also allows for identifying when a change in nature or direction of the 
relationship occurs when the effects of significant variables are controlled. Typically, the use of 
OLS regression with ordinal level dependent variables would not be the preferred method of 
analysis.  However, in this case OLS was used in lieu of Ordered Logit or Ordered Probit 
Regression to make the interpretation of analysis results easier for the reader. This is supported 
by Sturman (1996) who found that despite methodological expectations the use of OLS 
regression does not produce significantly more false positives than expected. While an ordered 
probit model appears to be a viable solution, it is not without problems. Aldrich and Nelson 
(1985) and Menard (1995) claim that ordered probit estimates often produce predicted values of 
the dependent variable that lie out of the range of the dependent variable. This happens for three 
reasons.  First, the formula under the proportional odds assumption assumes that changes in the 
dependent variable will be stochastic across all cross-category comparisons within the dependent 
variable.  That is, the effect coefficient (and thus error terms) produced and simultaneously 
estimated during the program's maximum likelihood iterations must be invariant across 
categories both higher and lower to the predicted value.  If heteroskedasticity is apparent within 
an estimated model, errant values are likely.  The second cause of problems using models with a 
limited range dependent variable model, is that a series of extremely large or small values in one 
of the explanatory variables may distort the distribution and variability of the residuals which in 
turn will influence the model's predictive power (Aldrich & Nelson 1984; Schroeder et al. 1986). 
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Third, Greene (1992) states that since the both the ordered probit and logit models depend 
heavily on the cross-classification algorithm, the presence of non-empty cells may cause the 
estimation process to either breakdown or produce faulty estimates. Thus, ordered probit does 
not allow of stable and easy interpretation of the effect of explanatory variables on a limited 
range dependent variable even if it does represent an underlying latent scale. This problem is 
further exacerbated when the number of categories of the dependent variable exceeds three and 
the number of independent or covariates exceed one. In these cases, it may be better to use 
multiple regression, noting that the effect estimate of the independent variable is a conservative 
estimate, although significant in the appropriate direction (Kennedy, 1992; Menard, 1995).  
Bohnstedt and Carter (1971) and Busemeyer and Jones (1983) claim that ignoring the true 
properties of ordinal level data and treating them an interval using some inferential methods 
rarely effect the making of a Type I or Type II error.  
 
Table 15: Group Statistics for Suspect Level of Resistance 
Test Period N Mean SD T-Value Sig.  
Pretest 523 2.04 .434   
Posttest 367 2.19 .468 -4.784 .000 
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Table 16: Level of Suspect Resistance— Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
 b SE b Beta t p 
Constant 1.842 .165  11.159 .000 
Pretest or Posttest .141 .030 .153 4.637 .000 
Situational Characteristics      
  No. Primary Officers .054 .022 .081 2.430 .015 
  No. Suspects .142 .073 .065 1.948 .052 
  Citizen bystanders .014 .013 .036 1.068 .286 
  Threat or Seriousness of  
   encounter 
.030 .022 .046 1.374 .170 
  Suspect Injury Type .066 .017 .128 3.771 .000 
  Suspect Sex -.059 .055 -.035 -1.071 .285 
  Suspect Black -.060 .033 -.066 -1.781 .075 
  Suspect Hispanic .002 .049 .002 .049 .961 
Officer Characteristics      
  Officer Age -.003 .003 -.039 -.894 .372 
  Officer Gender -.037 .066 -.019 -.562 .574 
  Officer Tenure .000 .004 .003 .066 .948 
  Officer Race .004 .022 .007 .197 .844 
 R2=.075 df = 13  F =5.478 F significance<.000  
 
 
The model summary presents an R Square value of .075, which indicates that this model 
is 7.5% better at estimating the value of the dependent variable by knowing the values of the 
independent variables. The F-test confirms this assertion. 
The multiple regression equation in Table 16 tests this hypothesis. In this model, we 
include the variable representing the type of test as well as a series of other situational-level and 
individual officer-level correlates of police force. Overall, the model is robust and represents a 
significant increase in the explanatory power by the value of F (5.478) and its corresponding 
significance value (.000). The results of the model suggest that, controlling for other factors 
present, on average there were higher levels of resistance in the posttest period. Further, other 
factors may contribute to the increased level of suspect resistance. These factors include the 
number of officers and suspects present as well as the seriousness of injury inflicted upon the 
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suspect. For each of these variables, the relationship is positive. Thus, the more officers and 
suspects present at an encounter, or the more likely an individual is to receive serious injuries, 
the more likely we are to see increased levels of force. None of the situational-level variables 
related to officer characteristics were found to be significant indicators of suspect resistance. 
The analysis findings indicate that a statistically significant difference in the level of 
suspect resistance was present after the change in agency policy. The levels of suspect resistance 
increased after the change in policy related to taser deployment. Based on this finding, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, and a significant difference in the levels of suspect resistance encountered 
by officers was observed after the change in organizational policy. 
Another fundamental question of this study is what effect the policy change had on the 
frequency of injuries to suspects. The safety of suspects in use-of-force encounters is a 
significant issue for public safety organizations. The following question specifically examines 
what effect raising the authorized level of resistance required for taser use had on the frequency 
of injuries to suspects in use-of-force encounters.    
Research Question 3: Frequency of Injuries to Suspects 
Research question 3 posited if raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for taser deployment has resulted in a change in the number of injuries suffered by 
suspects in police-citizen encounters. The null hypothesis related to this question states that 
raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for taser deployment has resulted in 
no change in the number of injuries suffered by suspects in police-citizen encounters. The 
hypotheses for this research question are:  
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H03: There is no difference in the number of suspect injuries after the change in 
organizational policy 
H13: There is a difference in the number of suspect injuries after the change in 
organizational policy 
 
The results of a cross-tabulation of the data on Suspect Injuries in the pretest and posttest 
groups are depicted in Table 17. To address this research question, a Pearson’s Chi square test 
for independence was conducted using the Suspect injured nominal variable. The Pearson’s Chi 
square test is a nonparametric statistical test that mathematically seeks to determine if two or 
more variables are distributed equally. This statistic is used to test the hypothesis of no 
association of the identified variable data. The Chi square test results also are depicted in Table 
17. 
 
Table 17: Chi Square Test for the Frequency of Injury to Suspects 
Suspect Injured  No Yes Total df x2 Sig. 
 Pretest 139 384 523 1 .337 .562 
 Posttest 104 263 367    
  243 647 890    
 
 
Based on the results depicted in Table 17, the Pearson Chi square value of .337 does not 
meet the required level to be considered significant at the .05 level. Based on this result, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. This finding supports that there is no difference in the overall number 
of suspects injured between the two reporting periods. Thus, it appears that the change in the 
organizational policy concerning when tasers should be deployed has likely had no impact on the 
number of suspects injured.   
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 The change in severity of injuries to suspects resulting from the policy change is another 
important area for examination. How severely suspects are injured in use-of-force encounters is 
one of the primary concerns of both the police and the public. One of the purposes of the Use-of-
Force Continuum and the policies that guide its use are the reduction of injuries to police officers 
and suspects. The effect on severity of injuries to suspects after the policy change is the focus of 
the following research question. 
Research Question 4: Severity of Injuries to Suspects 
Research Question 4 addressed the issue of whether raising the authorized level of force 
for using tasers has had any effect on the severity of injuries to suspects. This question is 
different from the previous one in that it is not just asking if the raw number of injuries changed 
after the change in policy, but, rather, it is looking to see if the severity of these injuries changed. 
Since tasers would only be used in higher risk police-citizen encounters after the change in 
policy, it is likely that the severity of these injuries would have, on average, increased. The 
research and null hypotheses for this research question are: 
 
H04: There is no difference in the severity of suspect injuries suffered by citizens in 
police-citizen encounters after the change in organizational policy 
H14 There is a difference in the severity of suspect injuries suffered by citizens in police-
citizen encounters after the change in organizational policy 
 
Group statistics for pre and posttest results for the Suspect injury type variable are 
presented in Table 18. These results indicate that, for the pretest group, the mean was 2.02, with 
a standard deviation of .835. The mean for the posttest group was 2.08, with a standard deviation 
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of .949. An independent samples t-test and regression model were performed to test this 
hypothesis.     
As shown in Table 18, the results for the independent t-test indicate that there is no 
difference in the level of suspect injury between the two reporting periods.  Based on this finding 
the null hypothesis is not rejected.  This supports that, on average, the level or severity of suspect 
injury between the reporting periods is roughly the same. No violations of normality were noted 
between groups.  
Since the t-test does not allow for examination of other control variables and how the 
addition of these other variants may influence the test, a multiple regression model was run to 
take these other factors into account. The use of a multiple regression model extends the 
bivariate analysis. This allows for identifying when a change in nature or direction of the 
relationship occurs when significant variables in the model are controlled.  
Table 19 presents the results of the regression model using suspect injury type as the 
dependent variable and using pretest and posttest, number of primary officers, number of 
suspects, the number of citizen bystanders, threat or seriousness of encounter, suspect resistance, 
suspect sex, suspect black, suspect hispanic, officer age, officer gender, officer tenure and officer 
race as the independent variables. 
 
Table 18: Group Statistics for Severity of Suspect Injury 
Test Period N Mean SD T-Value Sig.  
Pretest 523 2.02 .835   
Posttest 367 2.08 .949 -.929 .353 
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Table 19: Suspect Injury Type—  Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
  b SE b Beta t p 
Constant .893 .339  2.638 .008 
Pretest or Posttest .011 .059 .006 .192 .848 
Situational Characteristics      
  No. primary officers .123 .043 .095 2.870 .004 
  No. suspects .114 .140 .027 .812 .460 
  Citizen bystanders .098 .026 .127 3.825 .000 
  Threat or seriousness 
  of encounter 
-.062 .042 -.048 -1.459 .145 
  Suspect resistance .243 .065 .125 3.771 .000 
  Suspect Sex .230 .107 .070 2.157 .031 
  Suspect Black -.281 .064 -.159 -4.403 .000 
  Suspect Hispanic -.003 .094 -.001 -.032 .974 
Officer Characteristics      
  Officer Age .004 .007 .028 .655 .513 
  Officer Gender .265 .126 .068 2.098 .036 
  Officer Tenure -.011 .008 -.058 -1.336 .182 
  Officer Race .007 .043 .005 .165 .869 
R2= .096 df= 13 F= 7.174  F significance<.008  
 
 
The model summary presents an R Square value of .096, which indicates that this model 
explains 9.6% of the total variance of the dependent variable. The F-test confirms this assertion. 
Overall, the model is robust and represents a significant increase in the explanatory power by the 
value of  F (7.174) and its corresponding significance value (.008). When examining the 
regression results, the significant predictors of the severity of suspect injury include the number 
of officers and citizens at a scene, the level of suspect resistance, if the suspect was male, and if 
the suspect was not of African American descent. The presence of more officers and bystanders 
at a scene are likely to increase the severity of injury. Further, the more the suspect resists, the 
more likely they are to be injured. The only predictor of  severity of injury related to officer 
characteristics was officer gender. An examination of the breakdown of officer demographics in 
both the pretest and posttest data reveals that female officers used force 4.9% more often in the 
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posttest group. Of critical importance in this model is that the levels of suspect resistance (pretest 
vs. posttest) failed to reach the required level of statistical significance, thus confirming the 
bivariate relationship tested by the earlier t-test.  
One of the serendipitous findings in this model is related to the race of the suspect. 
Suspects of African-American heritage experienced less serious injuries than those of other 
races. This finding is difficult to interpret; however, what it appears to say is that it is possible 
that this class may resist less and, thus, be less likely to be injured more seriously. This argument 
is supported by the previous regression in that African-Americans were significantly less likely 
to resist at higher levels when a two-tailed solution was employed (See Table 16). It may be that 
this class of citizens have had tasers used against them in the past and, thus, appear to have more 
experience with the efficiency of these weapons. This, however, is only conjecture and should be 
tested by further research. 
Research Question 5: Frequency of Injuries to Officers 
Research question 5 posited a similar question. However, this question asked if raising 
the level of force on the Use-of-Force Continuum changed the frequency of injury to officers. 
This question is important because we would expect that after the change in policy regarding 
where the use of tasers are viewed as appropriate, we would expect that the number of injuries to 
officers would increase since the organization is limiting the available options for dealing with 
potentially dangerous suspects. For this research question, the research and null hypotheses are:   
 
H05: There is no difference in the number of officer injuries after the change in 
organizational policy. 
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H15: There is a difference in the number of officer injuries after the change in 
organizational policy.   
 
 To address this research question, a chi square test of independence was conducted using 
the nominal variable officer injured and the reporting period was run. The results of the cross-
tabulation are provided in Table 15. The data in this table reveal that officers were injured in 
only 4.6 percent of the cases in the first reporting period. After the change in policy, however, 
officers were injured in 7.4 percent of these encounters. While it does appear that officers were 
injured more after the change in policy, this difference of 2.8 percent may not be different from 0 
in a statistical sense. Hence, a chi-square test was run to test to see if this difference was large 
enough to claim that there was a statistical difference in these two reporting periods. Table 20 
provides the chi square test results.  
 
Table 20: Chi Square Test for the Frequency of Injury to Officers 
Officer Injured  No Yes Total df x2 Sig. 
 Pretest 499 24 523 1 3.059 .080 
 Posttest 340 27 367    
  839 51 890    
 
 
Based on the results shown in Table 20, the Pearson chi square value of 3.059 is not 
significant at the .05 level. As previously stated, while this finding does not reach the level of 
statistical significance at the .05 level, a larger sample of archival data might produce a different 
result.  Further research is warranted to more thoroughly explore this research question. 
Based on this finding the null hypothesis is not rejected.  This supports that there does not 
appear to be a difference in the number of officer injuries between the two reporting periods. The 
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frequency of injuries to officers did not significantly change as organizational policy limited the 
use of tasers to only those encounters involving higher levels of force.  
Officer Survey Response Data 
To capture data related to officers' perceptions of the effect of organizational policy 
change and taser use, a survey instrument was administered to a purposeful sample of 333 OPD 
officers.  The officers chosen to participate in the survey were identified by examining the 
archival use-of-force data and selecting officers who deployed tasers during both the pre and 
posttest periods. Only those officers who deployed a taser during these time periods and who 
were still employed by the OPD, were chosen to participate in the survey.  From the total number 
of officers contacted 130 completed surveys were returned, resulting in a response rate of 39 
percent. (See Table 6 for a comparison of survey sample population and OPD population 
demographics). 
 The survey instrument consisted of questions designed to capture officers' perceptions of 
how the change in organizational policy relating to taser placement on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum has affected their safety and the safety of suspects in use-of-force encounters. The 
survey also captured demographic information on the officers’ educational level, job assignments 
during the archival data study period, rank, agency tenure, and previous employment in law 
enforcement.  
A series of survey questions were posed to officers in a variety of subject areas related to 
the effect of the policy change on taser use and taser effectiveness. These questions asked how 
the policy change effected: the risk of injury to suspects, the risk of injury to officers, the proper 
placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum, and the effectiveness of the taser in 
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subduing noncompliant or combative suspects. Table 21 provides the respondents' demographic 
data. 
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Table 21: Respondent Demographic Data from Survey Instrument 
Variable Value N Pct  Variable Value N Pct 
Officer Race     Officer level of education    
 Black 11 8.5  Less than high school diploma  0.0 0.0 
 White 99 76.2  High School Diploma or GED  7 5.4 
 Hispanic 14 10.8  Some junior college but did not earn 
a degree 
 20 15.4 
 Asian 4 3.1  Associates Degree  16 12.3 
 Other 1 .8  More than two years of college but 
did not earn a degree 
 9 6.9 
 Missing 1 .8   Bachelors degree  53 40.8 
 Total 130 100.0  Some graduate courses but did not 
earn a graduate degree 
 15 11.5 
     Graduate degree  9 6.9 
Officer Gender     Skipped question  1 .8  
 Male 119 91.5  Total  130 100.0 
 Female 11 8.5       
 Total 130 100.0      
         
         
Rank in PD between 6/03 – 7/05     Assignment in PD between 6/03 – 7/05    
 Police Officer 111 85.4   Patrol 109 83.8 
 Master Police 
Officer 
3 2.3   Tactical 4 3.1 
 Detective 12 9.2   Detectives 12 9.2 
 Sergeant 3 2.3   Narcotics 3 2.3 
 Lieutenant 0 0.0   Motors 1 .8 
 Skipped question 1 .8   Skipped question 1 .8    
  130 100.0   Total 130 100.0 
         
         
Officer Age     Law enforcement officer tenure    
 N 127   N 130   
 Minimum age 25   Minimum Years 3   
 Maximum  age 54   Maximum Years 33   
 Mean 37.5   Mean 11.4   
 SD 6.264   SD 6.16   
         
Worked for another L.E. agency?     Orlando Police Department 
tenure 
   
 No 58 44.6  N 130   
 Yes 72 55.4   Minimum Years 3   
 Total 130 100.0  Maximum Years 33   
     Mean 9.45   
     SD 5.2   
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Research Questions from Officer Survey Response Data 
It is important to examine officer perceptions related to the key elements of this study to 
compare how officers perceive the change has effected their safety, the safety of suspects, and 
the effectiveness of the taser as a use-of-force method. Officer perceptions relating to these areas 
are compared to the findings in the archival use-of-force data. By making this comparison, the 
goal is for a better understanding of the aggregate effect of the policy changes on taser use and 
effectiveness. Research question 6 asks officers their perception on whether or not the change in 
organizational policy has increased the risk of harm to officers. The purpose of this analysis is to 
see if officer perceptions match with the behavior depicted in the archival data from police use-
of-force encounters. The analysis of archival data revealed that the frequency of taser use by 
officers decreased, while the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers after the policy 
change increased. There was no change in the frequency or severity of injuries to suspects as 
result of the policy change. There was also no statistically significant increase in the frequency of 
injuries to officers after the policy change. A comparison of the results of the archival data 
analysis and the officers' perceptions will generate valuable findings for discussion and further 
investigation. 
Research Question 6: Officers' Perception of Increased Risk of Harm to Themselves as a 
Result of Organizational Policy Change 
Research question 6 asked if officers perceive that the change in organizational policy on 
the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for when the taser can be used has increased 
the risk of harm to them in a use-of-force encounter. It is important to examine officer 
perceptions related to the change in risk to them resulting from the policy change as this may 
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have an effect on how frequently they deploy the taser and their level of confidence with it as a 
use-of-force method. If officers feel constrained by the more stringent guidelines of the policy 
change, they may opt not to deploy tasers and use some other method of control. It is also 
important to compare the archival data on the frequency of injury to officers to see if it matches 
with the archival data from use-of-force encounters.   
H06: Officers express no preference regarding whether the change in organizational 
policy relating to when the taser can be used increases the risk of harm to them in 
a use-of-force encounter. 
H16: Officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to when the taser 
can be used increases the risk of harm to them in a use-of-force encounter.  
 
Four questions on the survey instrument were asked to capture officers’ perceptions 
relating to the increased risk to them from the change in agency policy. Officers were first asked 
their level of agreement to the statement that: “The policy change relating to placement of the 
taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum increases the risk of harm to you from 
suspects during a use-of-force incident.” Table 22 provides the results for this question. 
  
Table 22: Officer’s Opinions on Change in Policy Increasing the Potential Harm to Officers 
Level of Agreement N Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 16 12.3 
Disagree 33 25.4 
Neutral 4 3.1 
Agreed 53 40.8 
Strongly Agreed 24 18.5  
 130 100.1 
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error 
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As shown in Table 22, the majority of the respondents, 59.3% (77), agreed or strongly 
agreed with this survey question. This would indicate that a majority of the respondents 
perceived that the organizational change that raised the level of resistance on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum where taser use is authorized increased their risk of harm during a use-of-force 
encounter. 
A second question on the survey instrument asked officers their level of agreement to the 
statement “Based on your experience would you say that being equipped with a taser makes you 
safer when working as a police officer.”  Table 23 provides the results for this question. 
 
Table 23: Officers Opinions on Possession of Taser and Officer Safety 
Level of Agreement N Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 5 3.8 
Disagree 7 5.4 
Neutral 8 6.2 
Agreed 38 29.2 
Strongly Agreed 72 55.4  
 130 100.0 
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error 
           
 
As in the previous model, 84.6 percent of officers agreed with this statement. Their 
opinion appears to show widespread support for the possession and possible use of taser by 
officers in the course of their law enforcement duties. They believe that having this tool provides 
for their safety and keeps unruly subjects away from them so that they do not have to engage in 
manual combat tactics or resort to pulling their firearm.     
A third question on the instrument asked officers their level of agreement with  the 
statement: “Based on your experience would you say that being equipped with an (ECD) taser 
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makes you more confident in your ability to control noncompliant or combative suspects?” Table 
24 provides the results for this question. 
 
Table 24: Officers Confidence in Use of Taser for Controlling Noncompliant or Combative 
Suspects 
Level of Agreement N Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 7 5.4 
Disagree 16 12.3 
Neutral 4 3.1 
Agree 55 42.3 
Strongly Agree 48 36.9  
 130 100.0 
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error 
 
 
As with the previous questions, the officers in this survey expressed confidence in the 
taser and its ability to help them control combative or noncompliant suspects. Overall, 79.2 
percent agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. This level of support was expected; 
however, it was not expected that 17.7 percent, or approximately 1 in 5 officers, did not feel the 
same way. It may be that these officers were involved in an incident that led to a disciplinary or 
citizen complaint issue.  Another possibility is that these officers do not believe that tasers are an 
effective LTL weapon. Clearly, this is a question that needs to be explored in future research.    
A fourth question on the instrument asked officers their level of agreement to the 
statement “Based on your experience would you say that the change in agency policy relating to 
placement of the taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum makes you more inclined 
to other use-of-force options prior to deploying an (ECD)?” Table 25 presents the results for this 
question and the officers’ level of agreement. 
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Table 25: Officer’s Opinions on Using Other Force Options Prior to Using a Taser 
Level of Agreement N Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 14 10.8 
Disagree 31 23.8 
Neutral 3 2.3 
Agree 48 36.9 
Strongly Agree 33 25.4  
 130 100.0 
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error 
 
 
A majority of the respondents responded to this question affirmatively, with 62.3 percent 
stating that they are more inclined to use other force options prior to deploying a taser. However, 
34.6 percent stated that this change in organizational policy made little difference to them 
regarding whether or not they would consider other options in the field. Thus, it may be possible 
that many officers, or at least about a third of the officers in this sample, do not pay heed to the 
placement of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum.   
A synthesis of these survey responses indicates a strong preference for the taser as a use-
of-force method and a perception that it provides a significant measure of safety for officers 
during use-of-force encounters. However, the results also demonstrate that officers perceive that 
the policy change makes them more inclined to use other use-of-force options prior to deploying 
a taser. It is also undetermined whether officers believe that the policy change decreases their 
ability to control suspects who are resistive or noncompliant. 
Based on these survey responses, the research hypothesis cannot be rejected. These 
findings support that officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to taser 
placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum increases their risk of injury during a use-of-force 
incident. The archival data related to the frequency of injury to officers revealed that there was 
an increase in the frequency of injury to officers after the change in agency policy. The analysis 
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of officers’ perceptions reveals that they believe that the policy change increases the risk of 
injury to them during a use-of-force encounter.  For this research question, the perceptions of the 
officers do in fact match the findings of the archival data analysis. 
Research Question 7: Officer Perception of Increased Risk of Harm to Suspects as a Result 
of Organizational Policy Change 
Research question 7 examined if officers believe that the change in organizational policy 
relating to the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for taser use has increased the 
risk of harm to suspects in a use-of-force encounter.  
It is important to examine officer perceptions related to the change in risk to suspects as a 
result of the policy change as this may have an effect on how often officers deploy the taser and 
their level of confidence with it as a use-of-force method. If officers perceive that the more 
stringent guidelines of the policy change may cause more severe injuries to suspects, they may 
again defer to other use-of-force methods to avoid inflicting injuries and/or generating citizen 
complaints. As in the previous research question, it is important to compare the archival data on 
the frequency and severity of injury to suspects to see if it matches with the archival data form 
use-of-force encounters.   
 
H07: Officers express no preference as to whether the change in organizational policy 
relating to when the taser can be used increases the risk of harm to suspects in a 
use-of-force encounter. 
H17: Officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to when the taser 
can be used increases the risk of harm to suspects in a use-of-force encounter.  
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Two questions from the survey instrument were asked to capture respondents’ 
perceptions relating to the increased risk of harm to suspects resulting from the organizational 
policy change. Officers were asked for their level of agreement to the statement: “The policy 
change relating to placement of the taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum 
increases the risk of harm to suspect(s) during a use-of-force incident.” Table 26 presents the 
results for this question. 
 
Table 26: Officer’s Opinions on Change in Policy Increasing the Potential Harm to Suspects 
Level of Agreement N Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 54 41.5 
Disagree 33 25.4 
Neutral 8 6.2 
Agree 25 19.2 
Strongly Agree 10 7.7 
 130 100.0 
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error 
 
A majority of the respondents, 66.9% (87) believed that the change in policy did not 
negatively affect the safety of citizens involved in use-of-force encounters. However, (35) 26.9% 
of the respondents felt that increasing the level of resistance before tasers could be used 
increased the likelihood that citizens may be seriously harmed. While this percentage is higher 
than what was found in the previous few runs, it may be that some officers are extremely well 
acclimated to electronic control devices such as tasers and believe that limiting their use is likely 
to mean that officers are more likely to be involved in hand-to-hand combat situations, where 
there is a higher likelihood of serious injury.   
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An additional question asked respondents for their level of agreement to the statement 
“Based on your experience would you say that the change in agency policy relating to placement 
of the taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum has increased the chances that a 
suspect confrontation will escalate to deadly force.” Table 27 presents the results for this 
question. 
 
Table 27: Officers' Perceptions that Restriction on Use of Tasers Will Increase Chances that a 
Confrontation Will Escalate to Deadly Force 
 
 
 
 
Level of Agreement N Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 35 26.9 
Disagree 30 23.1 
Neutral 19 14.6 
Agree 36 27.7 
Strongly Agree 10 7.7  
 
 130 100.0 
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error 
 
Officers in this survey were somewhat ambivalent as to whether or not the movement of 
the use of tasers on the Use-of-Force Continuum was likely to increase the chances that a given 
police-citizen encounter would escalate to a deadly force situation. Previous survey data supports 
that a majority of officers support the use of tasers for dealing with unruly suspects and like to 
have them in their complement of tools, it is likely that deadly force situations arise so 
infrequently that it may be unreasonable to expect any consensus of opinion on such a rare event. 
Although, when you examine all of those that disagreed (35.4%) and those that agreed (50%), it 
is clear that, on the average, officers do consider these ECDs as a valuable tool in their arsenal 
and one that may prevent a use-of-force situation from escalating.     
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Based on these survey responses, the null hypothesis is not rejected. This finding 
supports the notion that officers believe that the change in organizational policy relating to taser 
placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum does not increase risk of injury to suspects during a 
use-of-force incident. The archival data on the severity of injury to suspects revealed no 
difference in either the frequency or severity of injuries to suspects after the policy change. For 
this research question, the officers’ perceptions appear to match the archival data findings. 
Research Question 8: Officer Belief that the Placement of Taser on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum is Appropriate for Most Use-of-Force Encounters 
 Research question 8 examined the question of appropriate placement of the taser on the 
Use-of-Force Continuum for most encounters. It is important to examine officer beliefs related to 
the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum as a result of the policy change as this 
may have an effect on their level of confidence with the taser as a use-of-force method. If 
officers feel constrained by the more stringent guidelines of the policy change and do not believe 
that the policy change appropriately places the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum for most 
encounters, they may opt not to deploy tasers in favor of other use-of-force methods. 
For this research question, the research hypotheses are: 
 
H08: Officers express no preference as to whether the change in organizational policy 
relating to when the taser can be used places the taser on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum appropriately for most use-of-force encounters. 
H18: Officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to when the taser 
can be used places the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum appropriately for 
most use-of-force encounters. 
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One question from the survey instrument captured the respondents' perceptions regarding 
whether the change in organizational policy that increased the level of suspect resistance 
required to deploy tasers was appropriate for most use-of-force encounters. Officers were asked 
their level of agreement to the statement that “The placement of taser (ECD) at a level IV (active 
resistance) on the resistance and response continuum is appropriate for most use-of-force 
incidents.” Table 28 presents the results for this question.  
 
Table 28: Officer Belief that the Placement of Taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum at Active 
Resistance Level is Appropriate for Most Use-of-Force Encounters 
 
 
 
 
Level of Agreement N Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 9 6.9 
Disagree 24 18.5 
Neutral 3 2.3 
Agree 55 42.3 
Strongly Agree 39 30.0  
 
 130 100.0 
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error 
 
A majority of the respondents, 72.3% (94), agreed or strongly agreed that placement of 
taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum at a level IV (active resistance) is appropriate for most use-
of-force encounters. This indicates that a majority of the officers supported the policy that places 
the taser at a level on the Use-of-Force Continuum requiring active resistance for most use-of-
force incidents.    
Based on these survey responses, the null research hypothesis is rejected. The results of 
this survey question supports that officers believe that the change in organizational policy 
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relating to taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum places the taser at an appropriate 
level of force for most use-of-force encounters. 
Summary  
 This chapter presents an analysis of the data and research hypotheses related to the effect 
of organizational policy change on taser use and effectiveness. Table 29 below displays a listing 
of the research questions and related findings. Furthermore, an analysis of the archival data 
suggests that after the policy change that raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for deploying tasers, the frequency of taser use decreased. As expected, the levels of 
suspect resistance after the policy change increased. An analysis of suspect injuries revealed that 
there was no change in the frequency or level of severity of suspect injuries in the posttest 
period. The frequency of injuries to officers did not increase after the policy change. 
 Survey response data from officers revealed that officers perceive an increased risk to 
themselves as a result of the organizational policy change. However, officers perceive a 
decreased risk of harm to suspects as a result of the policy change. Officers expressed a belief 
that the organizational change placing the taser at a higher level on the Use-of-Force Continuum 
is appropriate for most use-of-force encounters. 
 A discussion and summary of these findings is presented in the next chapter as well as 
conclusions and recommendations for additional research.   
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Table 29: Summary of Research Questions and Findings 
Research 
Questions 
Subject  Accept or Reject 
Hypothesis 
Summary of Findings 
Question #1 Frequency of taser use Reject Null 
Hypothesis 
Frequency decreased 
Question #2 Level of suspect  resistance Reject Null 
Hypothesis 
Suspect level of resistance 
increased 
Question #3 Frequency of injury to suspects Fail to Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
No change in frequency of 
injury to suspects 
Question #4 Severity of Injury to suspects Fail to Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
No change in severity of injury 
to suspects  
Question #5 Frequency of injury to officers Fail to Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
No change in frequency of  
injury to officers  
Question #6 Perceived risk of injury to officer Accept 
Hypothesis 
Officers perceive increase in 
risk to themselves 
Question #7 Perceived increased harm to 
suspects 
Fail to Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
Officers do not perceive 
increase  in risk to suspects 
Question #8  Placement of taser on the Use-of-
Force Continuum is appropriate 
for most use-of-force encounters 
Reject Null 
Hypothesis 
Officers believe that placement 
is appropriate for most use-of-
force encounters 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS  
This study examined one agency’s experiences with organizational policy changes 
regarding taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum and officers’ perceptions of taser 
effectiveness. Two different time periods were identified for analysis, constituting one year prior 
to the policy change and one year after the policy change. In addition, a survey instrument 
captured officers’ perceptions of taser use and effectiveness as it relates to the organizational 
policy change, with additional survey questions related to the Use-of-Force Continuum as it 
relates to the taser. 
By examining both archival data and officers’ responses to survey questions, a clearer 
understanding of the influence of policy changes on taser use and effectiveness has emerged. 
This analysis was designed to see if officers’ perceptions coincide with the reality depicted in the 
archival data from use-of-force encounters. A comparison of the results of the archival data 
analysis and the officers’ perceptions generates important findings to stimulate discussion and 
further investigation. This type of examination will produce a more comprehensive investigation 
of the research questions and add academic rigor and value to the study’s findings and 
conclusions. 
Key Findings 
When and how often police use tasers remain a focus for public debate and criticism. 
Many police agencies have chosen to address these concerns by modifying their Use-of-Force 
Continuum policy relating to when tasers can be deployed. The effect on the frequency of taser 
use after the policy change was a primary question of this research study. A Z-test for the 
difference in proportions was applied to the number of arrests, the number of calls for service, 
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and the total number of uses of force in the year before the policy change and one year after. 
These results revealed tasers were used more frequently in the one-year period prior to the policy 
change. This finding also substantiates a reduction of taser use in the one-year period after the 
policy change. Therefore, the findings support that the change in organizational policy related to 
taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum did have a significant effect on the frequency of 
taser use. This change resulted in a measurable reduction in the frequency of taser use after the 
change in organizational policy. 
The injury of suspects in a use-of-force encounter is also a primary concern of police 
agencies. For this reason, the effect on frequency of injuries to suspects after the policy change 
was also examined. An analysis of the archival data suggests that there is no significant 
difference in the frequency of injury to suspects after the change in policy.   
The severity of injuries to suspects was also a primary focus of this research. The effect 
on severity of suspects’ injuries during use-of-force encounters after the policy change was also 
examined. The results indicate that there was no significant difference in the severity of suspect 
injuries after the change in organizational policy.  
Another important component of police use-of-force is the protection of officers during 
use-of-force encounters. Specifically, this research examined if injuries to officers occurred more 
frequently after the policy change. Data analysis results support that there was no difference in 
the frequency of injury to officers after the change in policy. The numbers of injuries to officers 
did not change significantly, as organizational policy limited the use of tasers to only those 
encounters involving higher levels of suspect resistance.  
  The level of suspect resistance in a use-of-force encounter is the primary determinant of 
the amount of force police officers can use to counter it. This force response is mandated by the 
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Use-of-Force Continuum. For this reason, the effect on levels of suspect resistance after the 
organizational policy change was also examined. The results of these analyses support the 
findings that there is a significant difference in the level of suspect resistance encountered by 
officers after the change in organizational policy. These findings indicate that levels of suspect 
resistance increased significantly after the policy change. Based on the structure of the Use-of-
Force Continuum and the purpose for its existence, this finding is not unexpected. The Use-of-
Force Continuum is a tool that guides the application of force, in incremental and proportional 
levels, to raise or lower force levels as the level of suspect resistance changes during an 
encounter. Therefore, since the policy change raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum for when a taser can be deployed, it is only logical that suspect resistance levels 
would also be greater. Officers are prohibited by their agency use-of-force policy to deploy 
tasers when less than the authorized level of suspect resistance is encountered. This finding 
supports that the organizational policy change produced the desired result, which was limiting 
taser use in lower-level (passive resistance) encounters. 
 The severity of suspect injury also was significantly influenced by the level of suspect 
resistance. This finding is reasonable based on the nature of use-of-force encounters and the 
escalation of force used to overcome resistance. As the level of resistance encountered by 
officers increased, so did the severity of the injuries incurred when force was applied to control 
that resistance.   
Several other control variables were also found to be significant. The number of primary 
officers involved in the use-of-force incident was found to be significant. This would indicate 
that the greater number of officers involved in the incident, the greater the influence on the level 
of suspect resistance. Given the fact that multiple officers are often sent to more serious and 
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potentially more violent encounters, this finding is logical and expected. The number of suspects 
involved in the incident was also significant. This finding also seems intuitive since the greater 
the number of suspects encountered in the incident, the more influence on the level of suspect 
resistance would be expected. A greater number of suspects involved in an encounter would 
indicate larger-scale disturbances or more serious crimes involving multiple offenders.  
Officers’ perceptions relating to the potential of increased risk to them posed by the 
policy change were captured in a survey instrument. Responses from these survey questions 
support that officers’ believe that:  
1. The change in policy increased their risk of harm during a use-of-force encounter. 
2. Being equipped with a taser makes them safer when working as a police officer.  
3. Being equipped with a taser makes them more confident in their ability to control 
noncompliant or combative suspects.  
4. The policy change makes them more inclined to use other use-of-force options prior to 
deploying a taser.  
 
These findings support a strong preference from respondents for the taser as a use-of-
force weapon and a perception that it provides a significant measure of protection for officers 
during use-of-force encounters. Despite this expressed confidence in the taser and the Use-of-
Force Continuum as a guide for its deployment, a majority of the respondent’s still perceive that 
the policy change increased their risk of harm during a use-of-force encounter. Respondents also 
indicated that they are more inclined to use other use-of-force options before deploying the taser.   
Officers’ perceptions relating to the potential of increased risks to suspects posed by the 
policy change were also examined. Two survey questions were asked to capture officers’ 
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perceptions relating to the increased risk to suspects from the change in agency policy. The 
officers believe that the policy change relating to placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum increases the risk of harm to suspects during a use-of-force encounter. Officers were 
then asked if the change in agency policy has increased the chances that a suspect confrontation 
will escalate to deadly force. Some ambiguity among respondents was noted regarding the effect 
of the policy change and the potential for an encounter to escalate to the use of deadly force as a 
result of the change in agency policy. Due to the infrequent and random nature of deadly force 
events, this finding is not unexpected. These results support the finding that officers do not 
perceive that the change in policy relating to the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum increases risk of injury to suspects during a use-of-force incident. 
Officers’ perceptions concerning whether the policy change that raised the authorized 
level of suspect resistance required for deploying tasers was appropriate for most use-of-force 
encounters was the focus of this survey research. Survey responses support the finding that 
officers believe the change in policy places the taser at an appropriate level of force for most use-
of-force encounters. Additional survey responses support that, in general, officers believe the 
Use-of-Force Continuum and makes their job less dangerous. 
Theoretical Implications 
 The theoretical framework for this study was based on the work of Thacher and Rein 
(2004). Their theory of value conflict and policy change explicates government’s tendency to 
balance competing goals or striking trade-offs among values. They define values-oriented 
casuistry, or rationalization, as a form of moral taxonomy that aids in values balancing.     
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The dilemma faced by police officers when use-of-force is indicated is that the placement 
of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum often conflicts with the officers' core value of trying to 
balance safety for all. In these situations, officers tend to use the taser when they see fit, even if 
this conflicts with agency policy. The testing of the officers' ability to balance these values with 
when to use this type of non-lethal force was the focus of this research study. The Use-of-Force 
Continuum and the policies that guide its use are the mechanism used by police to manage use-
of-force encounters. The policies that guide taser use and, more specifically, the Use-of-Force 
Continuum attempt to balance competing values of the safety of the public, including suspects, 
and the safety of police officers. The findings of this study indicate that, by changing the 
placement of taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum, the balance of safety between officers and 
suspects relating to the frequency of injuries was essentially unchanged as a result of the policy 
change. The policy change had no measured effect on the frequency of injuries to either suspects 
or officers. 
As expected, the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers increased as a result 
of the policy change. Unfortunately, no measure of the change in the level of severity of injuries 
to officers could be obtained from the archival data to conclusively resolve this question. The 
frequency of taser use decreased as a result of the policy change, which resulted in an increased 
level of safety for officers and suspects. In effect, the policy change reduced the probability that 
tasers would be deployed in use-of-force encounters during the post-change study period. 
These conclusions support the finding that the change in organizational policy relating to 
placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum has achieved the desired effect of 
increased safety to citizens. By increasing the level of suspect resistance required to authorize 
taser deployment, the frequency of taser use declined. This finding would seem to be supported 
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by the theory of value balancing as advanced by Thacher and Rein (2004). The net effect of this 
change may be increased saftey for the public by reducing taser use without significantly 
increasing risk to officers. 
Summary 
After an analysis of the archival data, the findings suggest that after the policy change 
that raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for deploying taser, the 
frequency of taser use by officers decreased, while the levels of suspect resistance encountered 
by officers after the policy change increased. The analysis of suspect injuries revealed no change 
in either the frequency or severity of injuries to suspects after the policy change. The frequency 
of injuries to officers also did not increase after the policy change.      
Survey response data from officers revealed that, while officers perceive an increased 
risk of harm to themselves as a result of the organizational policy change, they did not perceive 
an increased risk of harm to suspects. Officers expressed a belief that the organizational change 
is appropriate for most use-of-force encounters. Given the existing literature on police culture 
and behavior, this finding is unexpected and compelling. As prior research has revealed, police 
officers do not universally accept organizational policy changes (Crank and Langworthy 1992; 
Lingamneni, 1979). Officers have demonstrated a particular aversion to specific policy changes 
that limit the use of police discretion. This research study’s findings would seem to contradict 
this conventional finding and lend support to the premise that officers will accept some forms of 
change when practical experience and application are factored into the formation of their 
perceptions. 
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Comparing archival data findings and the officer survey responses yielded an interesting 
finding. The analysis of archival data depicts no change in the frequency or severity of injuries to 
suspects as result of the policy change. There was no statistically significant increase in the 
frequency of injuries to officers after the policy change. Survey responses from officers reveal a 
belief that the policy change that altered the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force 
Continuum increases their risk of injury.  However, this belief is not supported by the findings 
from the analysis of the archival data. These beliefs may emphasize a level of frustration on the 
part of officers, who perceive the policy change as limiting their discretion, and this limitation 
may be seen by officers as weakening their ability to act promptly and decisively in a use-of-
force encounter.  
 The analysis of archival data reveals that the severity of injuries to suspects after the 
policy change did not change. Officer survey responses also indicate a perception that there is no 
increased risk of injury to suspects from the change in policy. It appears that the officers’ 
perceptions that there is no increased risk to suspects as a result of the policy change are 
supported by the archival data. 
Methodological Limitations 
This research study produced a number of relevant findings relating to organizational 
policy change and taser use. This study uses methods of acquiring data through research of 
related literature, examination of use-of-force documentation, review of related agency 
documents, and analysis of officer survey responses. However, several limitations and 
methodological shortcomings were apparent in this study. This method of analysis is limited in 
the following ways: 
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This research study is limited to the use of taser weapons by a single police agency. 
Because a single police agency was used for analysis, some aspects of this research may not be 
generalizable to the greater law enforcement population.  Every effort was made to insure that 
OPD was in fact representative of other mid size police agencies.  
The OPD’s policies and practices regarding deployment of taser weapons are unique to 
their organization, and they may also alter the way the data was interpreted. Certain terminology 
and formatting had to be generalized to correspond with more mainstream use-of-force terms and 
context. This was only done to add clarity and to inform the reader. 
Data related to the injuries to suspects relied on the accurate documentation of the 
injuries by the investigating police supervisor. The level of detail as to the extent and description 
of injuries can be subjective and difficult to categorize. No details were provided as to the 
severity of injuries to officers on the use-of-force forms. Every effort was made to maintain 
consistency in recording the responses related to the extent of injury recorded on the use-of-force 
form, however, this is largely based on the observations of the reporting officer.    
The use of self-reported data by officers in use-of-force incidents can lead to 
exaggeration of certain aspects of an event, such as the level of resistance exhibited by the 
suspect or accurately describing the injuries to a suspect during an encounter. This limitation has 
been noted in previous studies that use archival use-of-force data. 
Similarly, the categorizing of incident types for the levels of resistance encountered and 
for the seriousness of the threat encountered relied on accurate descriptions and categorizing of 
the incidents that led to the use-of-force incident. Every effort was made to consistently 
document and classify these data.   
 129
   
 For the survey research portion of the study, the principal limitation was the low response 
rate to the survey instrument. The response rate for the electronic survey was 39%, or 130 
respondents out of 333 who were contacted and invited to participate. While this response rate 
was deemed acceptable, a larger response rate would be more desirable and add rigor to the 
study findings and conclusions. It is unclear exactly why the officer response rate was low. One 
can speculate that officers are reluctant to state their opinions about such a controversial topic. It 
could also be that officers feel that their use-of-force incidents already are scrutinized by the 
public and commanders, so why should they add to the debate by stating their opinions, which 
may be in conflict with agency policies and further reduce their discretion in use-of-force 
incidents. 
 The effect of the public controversy and the associated media reports that preceded the 
change in policy at OPD cannot be ignored. It is impossible to accurately measure the effect that 
this may have had on the frequency of taser use by officers during the identified analysis periods. 
The survey response data indicates awareness by officers of the public controversy and a finding 
that they believe that the change places taser use appropriately on the Use-of-Force Continuum 
for most encounters. The inability to measure the effect of this scrutiny on taser deployments in 
the archival data analysis remains a limitation of this research. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 Based on the findings and conclusions of this research study, the following 
recommendations are offered: 
 The replication of this research study using a larger sample, longer time frame, or 
multiple police agencies could yield additional valuable data and findings. These study options 
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would also increase generalizability, allowing for application to a larger law enforcement 
population. It would also be valuable to solicit the opinions of suspects and the general 
population regarding being exposed to tasers or witnessing someone being exposed to the taser in 
a use-of-force incident. This might provide valuable insight and further explicate the use of 
police tactics from the perspective of offenders as well as the general public observing such 
incidents.  
Additional studies could also be conducted that incorporate the use of chemical spray or 
impact weapons and organizational policy changes. These findings could be compared and 
analyzed for changes in outcomes or effectiveness. These studies could potentially yield valuable 
findings and add to the growing body of research on police use-of-force in general. 
 Applying this study template to other types of organizational policy changes, such as 
policies governing vehicle pursuit, police tactics, or deadly force issues, to evaluate positive 
outcomes or effectiveness could provide useful data. This type of research could yield valuable 
data to guide police decision makers when contemplating changes to policy and procedures 
related to high liability areas, such as use-of-force and vehicle pursuit. 
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APPENDIX A: OPD RESISTANCE AND RESPONSE CONTINUUM 
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RESISTANCE AND RESPONSE CONTINUUM 
ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
 
SUSPECT’S RESISTANCE EMPLOYEE’S RESPONSE 
LEVEL I – INDICATORS OF RESISTANCE 
    Non-verbal cues indicating subject’s        
demeanor and attitude coupled with an 
apparent readiness to resist. 
EMPLOYEE’S PRESENCE 
   The employee’s attitude and demeanor 
and their lawful right to be where they 
are. 
LEVEL II – VERBAL RESISTANCE 
    The subject’s verbal responses indicating 
non-compliance and unwillingness to 
cooperate 
 
VERBAL DIRECTIONS 
    The employee’s verbal communications 
that specifically direct the actions of the 
subject and offer the opportunity for 
compliance. 
LEVEL III – PASSIVE RESISTANCE 
    The subject fails to obey verbal direction 
preventing the member from taking lawful 
action. 
SOFT CONTROL 
    The employee applies techniques that 
have a minimal potential for injury to the 
subject, if the subject resists the 
technique. 
 
LEVEL IV – ACTIVE RESISTANCE 
    The subject’s actions are intended to 
facilitate an escape or prevent an arrest. 
The action is not likely to cause injury. 
 
HARD CONTROL 
    The member applies techniques that 
could result in greater injury to the 
subject, if the subject resists their 
application by the member. 
 
LEVEL V – AGGRESSIVE RESISTANCE 
    The subject has battered, or is about to 
batter a person/member and the subject’s 
action is likely to cause injury. 
INTENSIFIED TECHNIQUES 
    Those techniques necessary to overcome 
the actions of the subject, short of deadly 
force. If the subject resists or continues to 
resist these techniques there is a strong 
probability of injury being incurred by the 
subject. 
 
LEVEL VI – DEADLY FORCE RESISTANCE 
    The subject’s actions are likely to cause 
death or great bodily harm to the member 
or another person 
DEADLY FORCE 
    Member’s actions may result in death or 
great bodily harm to the subject. 
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RESISTANCE AND RESPONSE CONTINUUM (TECHNIQUE GUIDELINES) 
ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
 
EMPLOYEE’S 
PRESENCE 
♦ Lawful presence 
♦ Attitude and demeanor 
♦ Identification of authority 
VERBAL 
DIRECTIONS 
♦ Commands to direct subject action 
♦ Notification of arrest 
♦ Opportunity to comply 
SOFT CONTROL 
TECHNIQUES 
♦ Techniques having minimal potential of injury if resisted by a 
subject 
o Pressure points 
o Wrist locks 
o Arm bars 
o Compression techniques 
o Chemical agents 
HARD CONTROL 
TECHNIQUES 
♦ Techniques having a greater potential of injury if resisted by a 
subject 
o Forearm/knee/open and closed hand strikes 
o Strikes with the baton 
o Kicks 
o Takedowns 
o Head locks 
o Impact weapons 
o Tire deflation devices 
o Electronic control devices (TASER) 
INTENSIFIED 
TECHNIQUES 
♦ Techniques necessary to overcome actions of a subject short of 
deadly force.  
 
DEADLY FORCE 
♦ Techniques that may result in death or great bodily harm to the 
subject 
♦ The application of deadly force is not limited to the use of a 
firearm, and may include application of other techniques and/or 
weapons. 
EMPLOYEE/SUBJECT FACTORS AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
EMPLOYEE/SUBJECT FACTORS 
TO BE CONSIDERED: 
 
• Age 
• Sex 
• Size 
• Skill level 
• Multiple subjects or 
employees 
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES: 
• Mental incapacity 
• Close proximity to firearm or weapon 
• Special knowledge 
• Injury or exhaustion (member/suspect) 
• Disability 
• Imminent danger 
• Availability of weapons 
• Arrestee’s level of agitation 
• Alcohol/drug influence 
• Arrestee handcuffed 
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APPENDIX B: OPD DEFENSIVE TACTICS FORM 
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ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
DEFENSIVE TACTICS FORM 
NOTE:  FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY – UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL THIS FORM BE FILED IN 
CENTRAL RECORDS.  
TO: CHIEF OF POLICE Complaint #  
 ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT Sector:  
 District #:  
FROM:   Grid #:  
                          Name                                                                                 Employee #   
 
INVOLVED EMPLOYEE’S SECTION MANAGER:  
 
1. Incident Location:  Date:  Time:  
 
2. Time Supervisor Notified:  On Scene:  Other:  
       
 Name of Manager Notified:  Time Notified  
  
Type Incident: 
 
 
 
3. Offense Charged:  
 
 Offender #1  Name:  
A Race  Sex  DOB  Height  Weight  
B. Address  City  State  
C. Physical condition prior to incident (i.e., intoxication, prior injuries): 
  
  
  
D. Subsequent apparent injuries:  
E. Photographs of injuries:      Digital Image      35 mm    
 None taken       Why?  
F. Medical treatment of offender: Yes  No  Refused  
 If Yes, where?  By whom?  
 Date:  Time:  
 
 Offender #2  Name:  
A. Race  Sex  DOB  Height  Weight  
B. Address  City  State  
C. Physical condition prior to incident (i.e., intoxication, prior injuries): 
  
  
  
D. Subsequent apparent injuries:  
E. Photographs of injuries:      35 mm      Digital Image    
 None taken    Why?  
F. Medical treatment of offender: Yes  No  Refused  
 If Yes, where?  By whom?  
 Date:  Time:  
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4. Employees involved:  # Battered:  # Injured:   
       
 List principal employees in order of their degree of physical involvement: 
  
 Note:  For the purposes of this policy and procedure, a principal employee is:  “Any employee who encounters 
physical resistance from a subject and must use greater force than controlling techniques or restraint holds to 
overcome it.” 
 
  
 Name R/S DOH Age Employee # 
A.      
B.      
C.      
D.      
 
Attach copy of Charging Affidavit and/or Incident Report 
 
5. Implements used by employees: 
 
 ECD 
TASER 
Cartridge # 
 
Chemical 
Agents 
 
Impact 
Weapon 
 
K-9 
Stop Sticks/ 
Tire Deflation 
Device 
   
Specify Implement and Explain 
Employee’s Involvement 
A.         
B.         
C.         
D.         
 
6.
  
 
Physical technique used by employees. 
  
Tackle / Take 
Down 
 
Hands 
 
Other 
 
Specify Technique and Explain Employee’s Involvement 
A.     
B.     
C.     
D.     
 
7. List assisting employees and their physical involvement: 
 
 Name Employee # Involvement 
A.    
B.    
C.    
D.    
 
8. Witnesses 
 
 Name Address Phone # 
A.    
B.    
C.    
D.    
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Defensive Tactics Form - Continued 
 
SUPERVISOR’S NARRATIVE  (Include  [1] general circumstances;  [2] specific resistance encountered;  [3] physical 
techniques utilized;  [4] extent of injuries incurred;  [5] who incurred and inflicted the injuries;  [6] statement of 
witnesses;  [7] when applicable, appropriate manager was notified,  [8] supervisor’s endorsement; and,  [9] a 
statement whether the force used was in keeping with policy.) 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Approve 
 
Disapprove 
(Attach Dissent) 
 
  
Reporting Supervisor 
  Date 
  
Training Supervisor 
    Technique/Tactic Used   
 
Date 
  
Training Section Cmdr. 
  Date 
  
Employee’s Supervisor 
(If different than reporting supervisor) 
  Date  
  
Section Commander 
  Date  
  
Division Commander 
  Date  
  
Bureau Commander 
  Date 
   
APPENDIX C: OPD OFFICER SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
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APPENDIX D: IRB APPROVAL LETTER 
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